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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to compare low and high self-concept students to 
ascertain whether they differ in the causes they attribute to their performance on a 
problem-solving task. The relationships of gender to self-concept and gender to 
attribution preference were also examined. This study differed from previous studies 
examining relationships with causal attributions by focusing on students' attribution 
preferences for a task with an equivocal outcome as opposed to tasks with success and 
failure outcomes. 
Eighty-two year seven students from four Perth metropolitan primary schools 
participated in this study. The study was conducted using a 2 x 2 factorial design, with 
two levels of self-concept (low and high) and two gender groups (male and female), 
and four dependent variables. The dependent variables were the four causal 
attributions (ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty). 
The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale was used to measure students' 
global self-concept. An interrupted task procedure was developed to measure students' 
attribution preferences for an equivocal outcome. Quantitative statistical analyses 
were applied to the data collected to test for significant differences between the means 
of the relevant variables. 
The results from these analyses indicated that low and high self-concept ' 
students do not differ in the causes they attribute to their performance on a problem­
solving task with an equivocal outcome. Males were found to attribute their 
performance more to ability than females. However, no other gender differences in 
attribution preference were found. There was also no significant difference between 
the mean scores of males and females on the global self-concept measure. 
A number of conclusions were made based on the findings from this study. 
First, that global self-concept is not predictive of differences in students' attribution 
preferences for an equivocal outcome. Second, that males more than females take 
more responsibility for their task outcomes by attributing their performance more to 
their own ability. Finally, that gender is not a mediator for global self-concept. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Present insights into the self-perceptions of students have been aided by 
research on the self-concept and research on attribution theory. By focusing on both of 
these constructs in educational settings, researchers have gained an understanding of 
students' learning and behaviour. This chapter introduces these constructs and 
explains how they relate to the purpose of the present study. 
The self-concept is defined as a set of beliefs, attitudes, and expectations an 
individual has acquired about the type of person he or she is (Bracken, 1996). These 
perceptions individuals have of themselves relate to a number of areas, including 
intellectual status, physical appearance and body image, personality characteristics, 
and emotional tendencies. Self-theorists propose that the self-concept is not innate, it 
is the product of a lifetime of experiences developed through individuals' interactions 
with their environment (Burns, 1982). 
Attribution theory is a theory of motivation that attempts to explain how an 
individual's explanations, justifications, and excuses influence behaviour (Woolfolk, 
1993). Attribution theorists assume that humans are motivated essentially to 
understand themselves and the world around them; to "attain a cognitive mastery of the 
causal structure of the environment" (Stipek, 1993, p. 126). 
Self-Concept 
The self-concept remains one of the most widely researched constructs in the 
social sciences (Hattie, 1992). A number of theories regarding the self have been 
proposed over the past one hundred years. The four main theoretical approaches of 
this century are outlined here. 
James (1910) wrote extensively on the self as a major determiner of 
personality. James discriminated between two global aspects of the self - I (the 
knower or doer) and me (the self as a known). In describing the self, James proposed 
that there were three constituents to the self, a material self (body, family, and 
possessions), a social self (views others hold of the individual) and a spiritual self 
(emotions). 
Cooley (1912) and Mead (1934) developed these ideas of the self in the 
following decades. They viewed the self as being dependent on the social interaction 
of the individual with his or her environment. Cooley introduced the theory of the 
looking-glass self, which was based on the assumption that one's self-concept is 
significantly influenced by what the individual thinks others think of him or her. In 
recognition of Cooley's looking-glass self, Mead proposed that the self was essentially 
a social process, developed into a unique entity through the use of language within a 
social context. 
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Adler (1927), Freud (1943) and Erikson (1963) defined the self in terms of 
psychoanalytic concepts. These theorists were particularly interested in the self-other 
relationship. In psychoanalytic theory, the self is described as being composed of three 
parts - the ego, the id and the superego. The ego, essentially the self-concept, is a 
mediational structure which is learned as a result of contact with social reality. The 
various psychoanalytic theorists argued as to the basis of this social reality, with Freud 
suggesting it was psycho-sexual in nature, Adler that it was family and society, and 
Erikson that it was cultural. 
Phenomenological approaches to understanding the self emerged in the middle 
decades of the present century. Theorists supporting these approaches emphasised that 
an individual's self-concept could best be understood not by focusing on physical 
events, but rather how such events are perceived and experienced (Burns, 1982). 
Phenomenologists Snygg and Coombs (1949) claimed that individuals' behaviour is a 
result of their perceptions of a situation and themselves at the moment of their action. 
Similarly, Rogers (1951) asserted that individuals behave in terms of the way in which 
they see themselves, and that this is a conscious activity. 
Contemporary theorists of the self have elaborated on earlier theories, but have 
come no closer to consensus on a definition of self-concept than their predecessors. 
There have been two major theoretical approaches to understanding the self-concept in 
the last three decades. These have been self-concept as a unifactorial construct versus 
self-concept as a multifaceted-hierarchal construct. The unifactorial approach, most 
widely supported by Coopersmith ( 1967) and Marx and Winne (1977), suggests that 
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the self-concept is so heavily dominated by a single, general factor (the general or 
global self-concept) that separate factors cannot be adequately differentiated. The 
proponents of this approach also claim that children are too immature to make 
distinctions between different facets of self-concept, however, they concede that these 
different facets may become more or less important when compared to similar 
constructs. For example, facets of the academic self-concept become more important 
when compared to academic achievement (Hattie, 1992). 
The multifaceted-hierarchal approach to self-concept is gaining increasing 
acceptance among contemporary theorists (Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson, 
Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). The proponents of this approach claim that the global self­
concept is constructed of a number of different facets. Global, or general, self-concept 
sits at the top of the hierarchal tree, which then breaks into a number of smaller 
components, such as academic, social, emotional and physical self-concepts. The 
number and type of these components varies from one theory to another. The stronger 
the influence of the global self-concept, the closer to a unifactorial construct the 
hierarchal construct becomes (Hattie, 1992). 
The lack of agreement surrounding the definition and dimensionality of self­
concept has made the measurement of self-concept a difficult task. This measurement 
is made more difficult by the fact that the self-concept can not be seen, which presents 
limitations in determining its state at any given point in time (Labenne & Greene, 
1969). Consequently, a large number of instruments have been developed that claim to 
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measure the self-concept. Hattie (1992) concludes that "there seems to be as many 
measures of self-concept as there are researchers of the topic" (p. 140). 
The terms 'self-concept' and 'self-esteem' are often used interchangeably 
among measurement instruments. Theoretically the two constructs differ. Whereas 
self-concept is defined as the perceptions individuals have of themselves, self-esteem is 
defined as the evaluations individuals place on those perceptions (Burns, 1982). 
Despite this theoretical difference, in practice it is generally accepted that measures of 
one construct can be applied to the other (Hattie, 1992). 
There are generally two ways to measure the self-concept: by an individual's 
completion of a test or scale (self-report) or by observing an individual's behaviour. A 
combination of these two methods can also be used. The self-report technique is the 
most common form of measurement. Although there is a wide range of self-report 
instruments that claim to measure various aspects of the self-concept, relatively few of 
these instruments have been thoroughly developed, commercially published or widely 
used in research or clinical practice (Bracken, 1996). As a result, there has been a 
relatively small number of test authors ( e.g., Coopersmith, 1967; Piers & Harris, 1964; 
Rosenberg, 1979) who have made long-lasting contributions of significance to this 
field. 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory has a far shorter history than that of self-concept. The origin 
of attribution theory can be traced to the 1950s, at a time when social psychologists 
were largely interested in the study of human perception. Attribution theory developed 
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from this when theorists began to direct greater attention to people's ascriptions to the 
causes of their behaviour rather than their perceptions of the behaviour itself. The 
three most prominent attribution theories have been authored by Heider (1958), Jones 
and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1967). 
Heider (1958) is one of the earliest theorists to have provided a psychological 
framework to explain how people attempt to understand the causes of their own 
actions. Heider proposed a naive analysis of action theory, in which he argued that a 
person attributes the cause of some action either to internal ( dispositional) or external 
( environmental) factors. Heider' s distinction of these different classes of attributions 
served as a basis for subsequent attribution theories (Antaki & Brewin, 1982). 
Following this early work, Jones and Davis (1965) proposed an attribution 
theory which they called the correspondent inference theory. This theory placed 
particular emphasis on understanding the internal cause of a single instance of 
behaviour (with an external cause a default option made only when an internal cause 
could not be found). Their theory focused on identifying how people distinguish 
between different internal causes of behaviour. 
Kelley's (1967) multi-dimensional theory of attribution states that individuals 
attempt to explain behaviour in terms of how three variables covary across time. 
These variables were designated as the distinctiveness of the behaviour, its consensus, 
and its consistency. Distinctiveness of the behaviour describes how often a similar 
behaviour occurs (e.g., is it commonplace or something that stands out). Consensus 
describes whether other people act in a similar way in the same situation. Consistency 
6 
describes how similarly the person acts in a similar situation ( e.g., how consistent 
individuals' behaviour is with their typical behaviour). 
Based on this conceptual groundwork, Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and 
Rosenbaum (1971) proposed that individuals generally attribute their success and 
failure in achievement-related situations to one of four causal attributions, with their 
typical causal attribution for a given task defined as their attribution preference. These 
causal attributions are defined as the perceptions or beliefs individuals hold to explain 
an event by relating it to a cause. The four causal attributions proposed by Weiner and 
colleagues are ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty. These four attributions exist 
along three dimensions: locus of control, stability, and controllability, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
LOCUS OF CONTROL 
1111 .,I 
Internal External 
····A'· ··································· �-�ty 
......... ...... ................. cr�ck 
Effort 
/,c�ntrollable 
........... _ .. �+··· .... 
Figure 1. The Locus of Control, Stability and Controllability Dimensions of 
Attribution Theory (Barry & King, 1993, p. 392) 
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Ability is defined as the acquired knowledge and skills an individual brings to a 
task. Effort is defined as the physical and mental energy an individual exerts in 
performing a task. Luck is defined as the role that chance plays in the performance of a 
task. Task difficulty is defined as how easy or hard a task is to complete (Weiner, 
1974). 
In the locus of control dimension, attributions are organised as either internal 
or external (Weiner, 1974). Ability and effort are internal attributions because they 
refer directly to the person making the attribution (e.g., I am incompetent at spelling or 
I tried hard in my math test). Task difficulty and luck are external attributions because 
they refer indirectly to the person making the attribution (e.g., I failed my science test 
because the test was too hard or I did well in class today because I was lucky with the 
questions the teacher asked). 
Attributions can also be classified as stable or unstable (Weiner, 1974). A 
stable attribution tends to remain the same over time and situation, whereas an unstable 
attribution will vary across time and situation. Ability and task difficulty are viewed 
as stable attributions (e.g., I have always been good at spelling or timed maths tests are 
always hard). Effort and luck are viewed as unstable attributions (e.g., on some days 
students feel like trying hard, but do not always try equally hard in all situations, or 
sometimes a student will have a lucky day, but not every day). 
The four attributions can also be categorised as controllable or uncontrollable 
(Weiner, 1974). A person can either consciously manipulate a situation towards a 
desired end or not. Effort is the only attribution that is viewed as being controllable 
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( e.g., people can consciously try harder tomorrow than they did today in an effort to 
reach a desired goal). Ability is considered as an uncontrollable attribution, for it is a 
quality which a person is born with or which is acquired early in life as a result of 
specific experiences that develop one's capabilities. Likewise, luck and task difficulty 
are viewed as being uncontrollable, at least by one's self. 
Research into the field of attribution theory has increased in recent years, but 
measurement techniques in this area remain largely untested for reliability and validity. 
Similar problems arise to those in the field of self-concept, with difficulty in measuring 
an intangible entity. As a result, a large number of measurement devices have been 
developed. Current measures can generally be classified into three groups. Open­
ended questioning is normally performed in an interview style, with the researcher 
making qualitative judgements on individuals' responses to questions such as "Why do 
you think you did well on the test?". Self-report measures involve individuals 
responding to scales or checklists related to causal attributions. The direct-rating 
method draws on a combination of these two techniques, with individuals stating the 
reason for their performance, then rating the reason on attributional dimensions 
(Benson, 1988). 
Purpose of the Study 
Research on attribution theory and self-concept has important implications for 
classroom practice. Insights into attribution theory have enabled educational 
researchers to identify the causes that students attribute to their performance in 
achievement settings. These perceived causes are critical in the classroom because 
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they influence expectations for future performance, feelings of potency, and 
subsequent motivation to put forward effort (Hunter & Barker, 1987). Self-concept 
has also been shown to impact on students' behaviour and learning. Students who 
more clearly and positively assess their own ability to perform in school and who have 
more positive views of themselves and their capacities tend to do better in their 
schoolwork than those with uncertain, negative views of themselves (Burns, 1982). It 
is theorised that a substantive relationship exists between self-concept and attribution 
preference in individuals (Burns, 1979; Hattie, 1992; Marsh, Relich & Smith, 1983). 
The purpose of the present study is to further explore the relationship between 
self-concept and attribution preference. In exploring this relationship the following 
main research question will be investigated: What is the relationship between global 
self-concept and attribution preference in selected groups of primary-aged children? In 
addition to this, two secondary research questions will be investigated: Is there a 
difference in attribution preference between males and females? Is there a difference 
in global self-concept between males and females? 
Many teachers have a rudimentary knowledge of the terms attribution theory 
and self-concept, but few fully grasp the importance of these concepts in understanding 
students' learning and behaviour. This study aims to provide teachers with a better 
understanding of these terms and how they are inter-related. By being one of the first 
studies to measure students' attribution preferences for a task with an equivocal 
outcome, this study will uniquely contribute to the body of knowledge in this field. 
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Conceptual Framework 
A range of theories exists to explain the process of learning. The four most 
common theories are behaviourism, social learning theory, cognitivism, and 
humanism. The self-concept and attribution theory relate to learning within a 
cognitive framework. Figure 2 demonstrates how the present study relates to this 
framework. 
BEHAVIOURISM SOCIAL LEARNING 
THEORY 
THEORY OF 
MOTIVATION 
ATIRIBUTION 
THEORY 
ABILITY 
COG NITIVISM 
EFFORT 
:tf It, LUCK ... .,..a-------1,..• 
TASK DIFFICULTY 
HUMANISM 
SELF-CONCEPT 
GLOBAL 
SELF-CONCEPT 
� / ..-I _ G_ E_N-DE_R_,, 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework for Examining the Relationship between Global 
Self-Concept and Attribution Preference in Primary School Students. 
Note: The arrows represent the relationships under investigation in the 
present study. 
1 1  
The cognitive approach to learning views learning as "an active mental process 
of acquiring, remembering, and using knowledge" (Woolfolk, 1993, p. 238). 
Cognitive theorists claim that learning is the result of students' attempts to make sense 
of their world. The way students think about situations, along with their knowledge, 
expectations, and feelings, influence how and what they learn (Schunk, 1991 ). 
Cognitive theories of motivation state that behaviour is determined by an 
individual's thoughts (e.g., beliefs, expectations, goals, values) and not by whether the 
individual has been rewarded or punished for behaviour in the past (Stipek, 1993). 
Attribution theory is a cognitive theory of motivation that is concerned with 
individuals' beliefs about the causes of outcomes. The present study is based on 
Weiner and colleagues' ( 1971) model of attribution theory. 
The present study also builds on the suggestion of McHugh, Fisher, and Frieze 
(1982) that future research should investigate individuals' reactions to equivocal 
outcomes as opposed to limiting research to clearly defined success and failure 
outcomes. The need for such research on equivocal outcomes is necessary. Outcomes 
experienced by individuals in real-life are often not clear successes or clear failures. 
Individuals often have their own standards for what they consider to be a success or 
failure. As Maehr and Nicholls (1980) have pointed out, "success and failure are not 
concrete events. They are psychological states consequent of reaching or not reaching 
goals" (p. 9). In terms of educational settings, school tasks are often left ungraded or 
unfinished. Also, actual perceptions of success and failure will differ from student to 
student, and are not necessarily relative to an achieved score or grade. In the present 
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study, students' attribution preferences for a task with an equivocal outcome are 
measured. The methodology employed and its justification is described in the 
subsequent chapters. 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that contemporary theories of self­
concept can be dichotomised into those within a unifactorial framework or those 
within a multifaceted-hierarchal framework. The present study is conducted within a 
unifactorial paradigm and focuses on assessing students' levels of global self-concept. 
As the measuring device used in this study is that devised by Piers and Harris (1964), 
their definition of self-concept has been adopted. For the purpose of the present study, 
self-concept is defined as "a relatively stable set of self-attitudes reflecting both a 
description and an evaluation of one's own behaviour and attributes" (Piers, 1984, p. 
1). 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the constructs self-concept and 
attribution theory and to explain how they relate to the present study. The following 
chapter summarises the existing empirical research related to the research questions 
stated earlier in this chapter. Chapter Three defines the research design and outlines 
the research method developed for the present study. The results obtained in the 
present study are outlined in Chapter Four. These findings and their implications for 
educational practice are discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise research on attribution theory and 
self-concept as it relates to the purpose of this study and the research questions 
outlined in the first chapter. Empirical research examining the relationship between 
global self-concept and attribution preference is reviewed first. Research into gender 
differences in attribution preference and gender differences in global self-concept is 
then summarised. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the status of research in 
this field. 
Global Self-Concept and Attribution Preference 
Researchers are taking an increasing interest into the nature of the relationship 
between global self-concept and attribution preference. This attention is justified by 
evidence indicating that the perceived causes of success and failure in low and high 
self-concept individuals differ (Ames, 1 978; Fitch, 1 970; Ickes & Layden, 1 978; 
Weiner, 1 974, 1 979). An early study by Solley and Stagner ( 1 956), preceding the 
work of Heider ( 1958), alluded to such differences even though the researchers did not 
describe their findings in attributional terms. Solley and Stagner recorded the 
spontaneous remarks of low and high self-concept participants when given insolvable 
anagrams. They reported that high self-concept participants made remarks indicating 
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that they were externalising the cause of failure (e.g., "Is this a word?"). However, low 
self-concept participants indicated that they were internalising their failure (e.g., "I 
must be stupid"). Subsequent research has been able to replicate the findings of Solley 
and Stagner within the paradigm of attribution theory. 
Weiner (1974) theorised that individuals with a high self-concept are more 
likely to attribute success to ability and failure to unstable causes such as effort or luck. 
Conversely, he theorised that individuals with a low self-concept will attribute their 
success to unstable causes and their failure to a lack of ability. A number of 
researchers have used Weiner's theory as a basis for their studies, with many focusing 
on the specific dimensions of attribution theory (i.e., locus of control, stability, 
controllability). Even researchers who define their study using the four causal 
attributions (ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty) often report their findings in terms 
of the specific dimensions, especially locus of control. 
An early study by Fitch (1970) examined the effects of self-esteem, perceived 
performance, and choice on causal attributions. The participants of this study 
completed the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale followed by a dot-estimation task. In this 
task, participants were allowed three seconds to view slides projected onto a screen. 
Each slide contained a number of dots randomly distributed over its area. After 
viewing a slide for three seconds, the participants responded with an estimate of the 
number of dots on that slide. Each participant viewed ten slides. Success and failure 
outcomes were manipulated through the use of false performance feedback. 
Participants' attribution preferences were measured by the completion of a 
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questionnaire, which each participant completed after judging each slide. Each 
question allowed the participants to distribute causality for their performance over four 
possible causes (ability, effort, luck, and physical or mental state). This study found 
that individuals with a low self-esteem who receive failure feedback attribute their 
failure significantly more to internal causes than do individuals with a high self-esteem 
who also receive failure feedback. However, both low and high self-esteem 
individuals are equally likely to attribute success to internal causes. 
Ames and Felker (1979) explored the effects of self-concept on children's 
causal attributions and self-reinforcement. The participants of this study completed the 
Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale and six puzzles drawn from a stack at 
random. Instructions were given for the six puzzles that intended to create an 
ambiguity over the causal determinants of one's performance. Consequently, 
participants could perceive their performance on a task as predominantly caused by 
their own skill or by luck. The participants indicated their attribution preferences for 
their performance using a pie-graph device, similar to one developed by Nicholls 
(1975). Using this device, participants could attribute their performance either to skill 
or luck. The findings from this study suggest that when a task is characterised as 
involving skill or luck, the causal explanations of high and low self-concept children 
differ. Whereas high self-concept children causally relate success to their skill, low 
self-concept children relate their success to luck. Both low and high self-concept 
children use lack of skill to account for their failure. 
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Madonna, Bailey and Wesley ( 1 990) studied the effects of classroom 
environment and locus of control in identifying high and low self-concept children. 
The participants completed three scales: the Piers Harris Children's  Self-Concept 
Scale, the Classroom Environment Scale, and the Nowicki-Strickland Children's  
Locus of Control Scale. A differentiation of high and low self-concept groups was 
made using cut-off scores on the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale of below 
52 for low self-concept and above 62 for high self-concept ( out of a possible score of 
80). This study found that children with a high self-concept are more internal in their 
locus of control than children with a low self-concept, who are more external. 
Current research suggests that global self-concept may be a mediator for 
attribution preference. So far, research indicates a fairly consistent pattern: individuals 
with a high self-concept appear to internalise their success and externalise their failure 
more than individuals with a low self-concept. However, given that this research is 
typically based on information collected in highly constrained situations (e.g., 
attributions for a specific task), it is probably inappropriate to make conclusions about 
the general tendencies that characterise the attribution patterns of low and high self­
concept individuals. It is apparent that further research is necessary if general 
statements regarding the attribution preferences of high and low self-concept 
individuals are to be made. 
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Gender Differences in Attribution Preference 
Early writings on attribution theory did not address the issue of gender 
differences in attribution preference. However, a number of research studies have been 
undertaken in recent decades, showing that differences between gender groups may 
exist. Some of the first studies to address gender differences in attribution preference 
were conducted by Deaux and Emswiller ( 1 974) and Simon and Feather ( 1971 ), 
typically with college undergraduate students. These studies found that whereas males 
tend to make internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure, 
females are more likely to make external attributions for success and internal 
attributions for failure. A number of more recent studies have attempted to replicate 
these findings with varying degrees of success, as indicated by the studies summarised 
in this section. 
Researchers have generally used three principal models to explain gender 
differences in attribution preference. The proponents of the general externality model 
suggest that females tend to attribute both their success and failure to external causes. 
Possible explanations for this attribution pattern have included that females are higher 
in both fear of success and fear of failure, and therefore withdraw from achievement 
situations altogether (Simon & Feather, 1 973). Another explanation has been that 
females and other 'low status' groups tend to have less control over their destinies than 
those of a higher status, and this lack of control causes them to attribute outcomes they 
receive to external factors (Wiley, Crittenden & Birg, 1 979). 
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The self derogation model states that females attribute success to external 
causes and failure to internal causes (Nicholls, 1975). This model is based on the 
theory that females typically have low self-esteem in achievement settings (Frieze, 
Fisher, Hanusa, McHugh, & Valle, 1978) and therefore are more willing to believe 
negative information about themselves. The low expectancy model is based on the 
view that females typically have lower expectations than males in achievement 
situations, and that these expectations lead females to make unstable attributions for 
success and stable attributions for failure (Frieze et al, 1978). 
One of the early studies that was able to show gender differences in attribution 
preference was undertaken by Nicholls (1975). Nicholls examined the effects of task 
outcome, attainment value and gender on causal attributions. His research was based 
on the work of Heider (1958) and Weiner and associates (1971), and was one of the 
first research studies in which attribution preferences were indicated by the participants 
analysing the outcomes of their own behaviour, rather than imagined outcomes or 
outcomes of others' behaviour. The experimental task used to measure attribution 
preferences in this study was one in which the participants attempted to match acute 
angles in a book with standard acute angles mounted on a wall in front of them. All of 
the angles in the book were exactly between any two of the standard angles, with the 
difference between the standard angles being slight. Therefore, false feedback could 
be given to the participants regarding their success or failure on this task without the 
participants becoming suspicious. Before the participants attempted the task they were 
informed that the average score for a fourth-grade student on this task was twelve 
correct responses. Misleading feedback was then given to the participants according to 
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a pre-assigned schedule. They were given either six or eighteen correct responses, 
denoting a failure or success outcome respectively. The participants' attribution 
preferences were then measured using a pie-graph device, which could be adjusted to 
show the relative importance of the four causal attributions (ability, luck, effort, and 
task difficulty) to their performance. The findings from this study indicate that 
females attribute failure to low ability more than success to high ability, however 
males do not. Thus, females show a significant self-derogatory bias which is not 
evident for males. It was also found that males, more than females, attribute failure to 
bad luck. 
Cooper, Burger and Good ( 198 1 )  conducted a study based on the general 
externality model of gender differences in attribution preference. This study examined 
whether locus of control beliefs differed between young males and females. Like 
Nicholls ( 1 975), they found that a difference between gender groups existed, however 
they conceded that this difference was very small. This study used a standardised test, 
the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility (IAR) Questionnaire, which gauges 
internal versus external beliefs about academic performance, and contains separate 
sub-scales for success and failure outcomes. The items from the IAR Questionnaire 
require participants to select one of two alternatives that best explains the occurrence 
of success and failure at academic tasks. All IAR Questionnaire questions were read 
aloud by the researcher and the participants responded to these questions in written 
form. Contrary to the prediction of the general externality model, this study found that 
females in elementary school take more responsibility for academic outcomes than 
males. However, this difference, while significant, was very small. Prior to the study, 
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the researchers conducted a meta-analysis of ten previous studies that also looked at 
the relationship between gender and attribution preference. The findings of this meta­
analysis were supported by the findings of their study. 
Wigfield (1988) conducted a study that found few gender differences in 
attribution preference. His study examined how children's achievement attributions 
were influenced by age, attentional focus, gender, and success or failure experience. 
Similarly to conditions implemented in Nicholls' study (1975), Wigfield gave false 
success or failure feedback to the participants in respect to their performance on a 
memory task. This task involved participants listening to a tape-recorded story and 
then verbally recalling this story. As no participants were able to recall the story with 
100% accuracy, they were able to be given false feedback without becoming 
suspicious. Half of the participants were given success feedback and the other half 
failure feedback. The participants were then asked to rate the importance of several 
different reasons (ability, luck, effort, interest, and task difficulty) for their 
performance. The researcher read each question aloud and recorded the participants' 
responses on rating scales of 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important). This study 
found that males make somewhat more negative attributions than do females, 
attributing success more to task ease and failure more to lack of interest in school. In 
addition, males attribute failure more to lack of specific ability than do females, but 
this effect is only marginally significant. Wigfield, in his discussion of these findings, 
suggested that the task used in his study had close ties with reading, a subject which 
quite often females in elementary school prefer and excel in, and this could explain 
why males' attributions were somewhat more negative than those of females. 
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Burgner and Hewstone (1993) examined how males and females differ in the 
causes they attribute to their success and failure. Two tasks were completed 
individually by each participant. The first was a seven piece jigsaw of a clown, which 
was successfully completed by all participants. The second was a very difficult wire­
loop tracing game, in which the participants had to move a wire loop around a twisting 
wire. No participant was successful at this task. Following each task, the participants 
were asked an open-ended question and their response to this question determined their 
attribution preferences for their performance. The researchers found that significant 
gender differences did exist in attribution preference. Both males and females use 
internal attributions to explain their performance, however males more than females 
attribute their success to their ability. Males tend not to attribute their failure to lack of 
ability, but females do. Under conditions of failure, males tend to use explanations 
significantly more than females, while their use under conditions of success is 
approximately the same. The researchers' findings overall tend to support the self 
derogation model of gender differences in attribution preference. 
While the research studies described in this section have shown a relationship 
between gender and attribution preference, many have failed to replicate earlier 
findings, generated contradictory results, or produced findings suggestive of weak 
relationships. The variety of instruments used to measure attribution preferences for 
success and failure, as well as differences in the tasks employed and in the settings in 
which such attributions were elicited, may help to explain these conflicting findings. 
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Gender Differences in Global Self-Concept 
The question of the nature of the relationship between gender and global self-
concept has interested many researchers. A number of research studies have been 
conducted in an attempt to show whether a significant difference exists between the 
self-concept of males and females. While it is theorised that males will have a higher 
global self-concept than females, empirical findings have varied in their acquiescence 
of this hypothesis. 
Some researchers in this field have shown that males do have a higher global 
self-concept than females, however the reported effect size is usually relatively small. 
Alpert-Gillis and Connell (1989) were able to show a marginally significant difference 
in the global self-concept of male and female fourth to sixth grade students. The 
Perceived Competence Scale for Children was used to measure the participants' self­
concept. This 28-item scale measures children's self-concept in three areas - cognitive, 
social and physical - with a fourth sub-scale for global self-concept. While the 
researchers were able to show that males have a marginally significant higher global 
self-concept than females, this difference was extremely small in magnitude. O'Brien 
( 1991) also found some significant gender differences both for global and dimensional 
self-concept, but once again, these differences were very small. His study used the 
Multi-dimensional Self-Esteem Inventory, which measures global self-esteem and 
eight components of self-esteem. 
There has been much speculation as to the genesis of gender differences in 
global self-concept. These differences are commonly linked to the stereotypes of 
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males and females. Burns (1979) suggests that gender differences become more 
apparent as females tune into the fact that stereotypic characteristics of the female self­
image are less valued than those of males. Other arguments, such as "females are in a 
minority group status, females fulfil societal expected roles, females have more role 
conflict than males, females are more socially and economically dependant, and 
cultural ideology calls for women to be regarded as inferior" (Hattie, 1992, p. 177) 
have also been suggested as reasons accounting for females lower global self-concept. 
A number of other researchers however, have been unable to find significant 
differences in the global self-concepts of males and females. Piers and Harris (1964), 
while developing their measurement scale, were unable to show a significant 
difference between the self-concept of males and females in a sample of 363 third to 
tenth grade students. The measurement device used was a preliminary scale of 140 
items, which was trimmed to its current 80 items following the study. In a study by 
Crase and Elrod (1980), which investigated children's global self-concept and 
perceptions of parental behaviour using the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept 
Scale, no significant gender differences in self-concept were found in a sample of 172 
fifth and sixth grade students. A number of other studies using the Piers-Harris 
Children's Self-Concept Scale, including those by De Voe (1977), Moyal (1977), and 
Ketcham and Snyder (1977) were also unable to report significant differences in global 
self-concept between males and females. 
Wylie (1979), in an examination of 47 research investigations into the 
relationship between global self-concept and gender, found that non-significant 
24 
relationships dominated the findings. Wylie (1974) had previously hypothesised that 
gender differences may exist for specific facets of self-concept, but these differences 
are obscured when the items on a self-concept measure are summed to give a total, or 
global, self-concept score. 
Hattie and Mclnman (1991) conducted a meta-analysis on data collected from 
77 studies that compared global self-concept and gender on self-concept measures. 
They found that, while the mean self-concept score of males was slightly higher than 
that of females, this difference was so slight as to be almost negligible. They 
concluded that there was no overall relationship between gender and global self-
concept. They did, however, find that there were differences on some dimensions of 
self-concept, and that males tend to attribute positive concerns to themselves and are 
self-enhancing, while females tend to attribute negative concerns to themselves and are 
self-verifying. These findings are consistent with the earlier findings of Wylie (1979). 
Researchers who have found no gender differences in global self-concept have 
concluded that females may appear to have a lower self-concept than males perhaps 
because females are more willing to disclose personal weaknesses. Bogo, Winget and 
Gieser (1970) investigated male and female responses on self-concept lie or 
defensiveness scales. Such scales reflect the extent to which individuals disguise their 
true feelings and present a more favourable picture of themselves on a self-concept 
measure. From this investigation, the researchers reported that males obtained higher 
scores on these scales than females and thus concluded that males more than females 
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are more likely to provide information about themselves that they believe to be 
socially desirable. 
Wylie ( 1979) has also offered several explanations as to the lack of support by 
empirical research for the theory that males have a higher global self-concept than 
females. She argues that studies rarely deal purely with the variable of gender, and 
consequently, questions are often worded in such a way that they may depress the self­
concept of males, who are perhaps more likely to read poorly or lack motivation in 
school-related tasks. Another possibility for the apparent similarity in the global self­
concepts of males and females is that gender differences are obscured when many 
facets are summed. Males and females may therefore gain similar scores by endorsing 
different sets of items. 
The issue of gender differences in global self-concept remains a controversial 
one. Some researchers continue to espouse the theory that males have a higher global 
self-concept than females, despite few researchers having been able to verify such a 
relationship. The findings of the cited research would suggest that gender is a poor 
predictor of global self-concept, and that males and females are more similar than 
different in regards to global self-concept. 
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Summary 
A number of theories have been proposed to explain putative relationships 
among global self-concept, attribution preference, and gender. The principles of these 
theories have been outlined in this chapter. Weiner (1974) theorises that individuals 
with a high self-concept attribute their success to ability and their failure to unstable 
causes ( effort and luck), while individuals with a low self-concept attribute their 
success to unstable causes and their failure to a lack of ability. In respect to gender 
differences in attribution preference, three theories were discussed. The first theory 
states that females are more likely to attribute success to external causes and failure to 
internal causes (ability and effort). The proponents of the second theory suggest that 
females attribute both success and failure to external causes (luck and task difficulty). 
Proponents of the third theory claim that females attribute their success to unstable 
attributions and their failure to stable attributions (ability and task difficulty). In 
reference to gender differences in global self-concept, it is theorised that males have a 
higher global self-concept than females. 
The empirical findings cited in this chapter have varied in their support for the 
key propositions of these theories. Research into the relationship between global self­
concept and attribution preference has tended not to support Weiner's (1974) theory. 
Rather, it has shown that high self-concept individuals tend to attribute success to 
internal causes and failure to external causes, and vice versa for low self-concept 
individuals. Researchers who have explored the relationship between gender and 
attribution preference have tended to show small differences in how males and females 
attribute causes to their performance, however none of the three models was fully 
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supported. Few studies have indicated a significant difference in the global self­
concept of males and females, and this difference, when found, has tended to be 
relatively small. 
The present study differs from previous studies investigating relationships with 
causal attributions by focusing on participants' attribution preferences for an equivocal 
outcome as opposed to success or failure outcomes. Given this difference in task 
outcomes, it is inappropriate to make predictions about the findings of the present 
study where relationships with causal attributions are examined. However, from the 
evidence given in this chapter it is possible to predict that if a difference is to be shown 
between the global self-concepts of males and females, then this difference will be 
small, with males having a slightly higher global self-concept than females. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This chapter outlines the research method developed for this study. The 
chapter begins with a description of the research design followed by details of the 
research sample. The materials used and the procedure implemented in the study are 
given. The chapter concludes with a statement of the three research hypotheses tested 
by the study. 
Research Design 
Keppel (1991) has indicated that afactorial design is the most common means 
by which two or more independent variables are manipulated in an experiment or 
comparative study. In a factorial design, the experiment includes every possible 
combination of the levels of the independent variables. The present study was 
conducted using a 2 x 2 factorial design, with two levels of self-concept (high and 
low), and two gender groups (males and females), and four dependent variables. The 
four dependent variables are the four causal attributions (ability, effort, luck, and task 
difficulty). This factorial design and the distribution of participants in the cells of the 
design are represented by the matrix in Table 1 .  
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Table 1. Research Factorial Design 
Male 
GENDER 
Female 
Participants 
SELF-CONCEPT 
Low High 
14  14  
1 6  1 6  
Data for this study were collected from year seven students in four schools in 
the Perth metropolitan region. Socio-economic bias was controlled by choosing 
schools within middle socio-economic areas. The schools were selected randomly 
from this group. 
Eighty-two year seven students took part in this study. There were 36 males 
and 46 females. This age group was selected because at this age children are more 
capable of making the necessary abstractions to represent accurate feelings of the self 
and of their performance (Gilberts, 1 983). This sample was divided into three levels of 
self-concept, with 3 7 low self-concept students, 30 high self-concept students and the 
remaining 1 5  students constituting a middle self-concept group. The basis for this 
division was determined by the students' responses to the Piers-Harris Children's  Self­
Concept Scale. Students obtaining a score of 58  or less out of a possible score of 80 
were defined as having a low self-concept, students obtaining a score of 65 or more 
were defined as having a high self-concept and students obtaining a score between 59 
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and 64 were defined as having a middle self-concept. These cut-off scores were chosen 
to remove the middle fifth of the self-concept scores, thereby creating a definitive 
division between low and high self-concept groups. In order to balance the number of 
participants in the low and high self-concept groups, the data obtained from seven 
students were randomly deleted prior to the data analysis. 
The participants of this study were assured that the data obtained for the study 
would be kept confidential. Consent was required from the students' parents, teacher 
and school principal before they were allowed to participate in the study. Parent 
consent letters and an information sheet for teachers were distributed prior to the 
commencement of the study. The purpose of the information sheet was to provide 
teachers with a background knowledge of the study, including the research aim, 
method, and benefits of the research. A copy of the parent consent letter and the 
teacher information sheet are shown in Appendix A. 
Materials 
The Piers-Harris Children 's Self-Concept Scale (Piers & Harris, 1964) was 
used to measure the participants' levels of global self-concept. The test consists of 
eighty 'yes-no' items, written as simple declarative statements, such as 'I am 
unpopular' and 'I have good ideas'. The overall global self-concept score is derived 
by adding all responses that are in the direction of high self-concept. The scale focuses 
on children's self-perceptions rather than attempting to infer their self-concept by 
observing the behaviour or the attributions of others. 
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Numerous studies in this field (e.g., Ames & Felker, 1979; Crase & Elrod, 
1980; De Voe, 1977) have been based on the assumption that evaluative statements 
made by individuals about themselves are valid and reliable sources of data. Several 
theorists in this field have also expressed their beliefs about the importance and value 
of using self-reports as measurement instruments of self-concept. For example, 
Allport (1943) has written that the individual has the right to be believed when he or 
she reports about his or her self. Similarly, Rogers (1951) claims that self-reports are 
valuable sources of information about the individual. 
The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale was originally developed as a 
research instrument to provide a quantitative self-report measure of children's self­
concepts. This is still one of its primary purposes. It has also been used extensively to 
investigate the relationship between self-concept and other traits or behaviours (e.g., 
locus of control, personality characteristics, achievement), to monitor changes in self­
concept over time, and to address fundamental questions about the nature of children's 
self-evaluative attitudes and their possible antecedents (Piers, 1984). 
The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale has proven to have satisfactory 
reliability and validity. A number of studies (e.g., Alban-Metcalfe, 1981; Lefley, 
1974; Shavelson & Bolus, 1982) have investigated the test-retest reliability of this 
instrument, and have repeatedly shown reliability coefficients of more than 0. 7 in 
general populations. The validity of the scale has been measured against peer and 
teacher ratings, other self-concept measures, and other behavioural and personality 
measures (e.g., Felker & Thomas, 1971; Karnes & Wherry, 1982; Parish & Taylor, 
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1978). Satisfactory correlations were found with all of these measures, the highest 
being with the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (r = .85), which resembles the 
Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale in format and age range (Piers, 1984). The 
Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale has also been successfully validated with 
Australian School students (Amato, 1984). 
This Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale was chosen for the present 
study because it is the most widely used and tested measure of global self-concept. 
The instrument is simple to administer and score and yields quantitative scores that 
permit easy comparison. The test has also been used extensively and successfully in 
many studies with primary school students and has been proven suitable for use with 
Australian primary school students (Amato, 1984). The prevalence of the Piers-Harris 
Children's Self-Concept Scale as a measure of self-concept is indicated in a study by 
Hattie (1992). The terms Piers, Harris, self-concept and self-esteem were used to 
search the ERIC and Psychological Abstracts data banks. From this search a total of 
145 studies based on 41,669 persons that included these terms were found. Of this 
sample 36% came from upper primary school, 42% came from lower primary school, 
and 22% from preschool. 
A problem-solving task was used to measure the participants' attribution 
preferences for their performance. Following this task, the students answered a series 
of questions in which they could rate the importance of each of the four causal 
attributions (ability, effort, luck, task difficulty) to their performance. A near-identical 
problem was presented to the students three times. Each problem consisted of a 6 x 6 
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checkerboard with black and white squares. These problems and the questions 
presented to the students are shown in Appendix B. This problem-solving task was 
chosen as the researcher considered that it allowed the students to neutrally attribute 
their performance to any of the four causal attributions. It had the advantage of being 
easy to administer and comprehensible, yet challenging to this year level. This task 
was attempted and the questions completed three times to improve the validity of the 
measurement technique. By keeping the tasks similar, the attribution preferences 
measured by the task were controlled. For example, if different tasks were used each 
time, different attributions may have been elicited from different groups of students. 
After each task was attempted, the participants answered eight questions related 
to the four causal attributions. The method of magnitude scaling was used to record 
the participants' responses to these questions. Magnitude scaling has been developed 
by researchers in an attempt to more accurately measure the direction and strength of 
people's beliefs and preferences. Until this technique was developed, the most 
common tool used to measure these entities was category scaling (a Likert scale in its 
most common form), in which a person rates an item or expresses a judgement by 
selecting one of a number of fixed options. This technique, however, has a number of 
limitations. First, information is lost due to the limited categories presented by 
category scaling. Second, the nature of the scale forces respondents to judge items 
similarly. Third, by offering a fixed number of categories for the respondents to 
choose from, the researcher is unintentionally affecting the response, by forcing the 
respondents into making judgements that may not really apply to them (Lodge, 1981 ). 
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The use of magnitude scaling addresses these limitations by allowing the 
respondent almost unlimited variety of response, yet yields quantitative data. In this 
method, respondents indicate the direction and strength of their beliefs by relating 
them to an arbitrary scale, which is determined by either the researcher or the 
respondent. An example of this is where respondents rate the brightness of different 
lights. Using magnitude scaling, the researcher shows the respondent a low- or 
medium-intensity light, and either assigns a value to its brightness or allows the 
respondent to assign a value to its brightness. The respondent then rates the brightness 
of all other lights to the original reference light. For example, if the respondent thinks 
that the light is half as bright as the first light, he or she assigns a value of half of the 
reference value (Lodge, 1981 ). 
In the present study the magnitude scaling technique was adapted to measure 
the participants' preferences for each of the four causal attributions. The length of a 
line drawn by the students was used to gauge the degree of the students' beliefs. First, 
a reference line was drawn by each student in response to a question such as "How 
much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a difference in how well a 
student does this problem?". The researcher used a teacher as the standard for the 
reference line because all students are familiar with the role of the teacher in a school. 
It was feasible for students to envisage what a teacher would think of an individual's 
performance in such a situation. The students then drew a response line to indicate 
their perception of the importance of the attribution to their performance in response to 
a question such as "How much do you think that luck made a difference in how well 
you did this problem?". The relationship of this second line to the first line indicated 
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the relative importance of the causal attribution to the students' performance on the 
problem-solving task. An example of two students' responses using the magnitude 
scaling technique are shown in Figure 3. In these examples, student A would receive a 
higher attribution score for luck than student B. 
Student A 
1 A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does this problem? 
1 B. How much do you think that luck made a difference in how well you 
did this problem? 
Student B 
1A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does this problem? 
1 B. How much do you think that luck made a difference in how well you 
did this problem? 
Figure 3. Example of Two Students' Responses usmg the Magnitude Scaling 
Technique 
Prior to the commencement of the study, a pilot study was conducted with a 
group of year seven students in order to determine the suitability of the problem­
solving task with the year level and the method of testing. Following this pilot study, 
several adjustments were made, including the addition of four short scenarios, which 
were required to more clearly define the terms 'ability', 'effort', 'luck' and 'task 
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difficulty'. These scenarios were read aloud to the students. For example, in order to 
more clearly define the concept of luck, the following scenario was presented to the 
class: 
John was competing in a running race. The lanes next to him had 
been wet by a broken water pipe. This made these lanes very 
slippery and difficult to run fast. John's lane was dry and this 
allowed him to run a lot faster than his other opponents. John won 
his race. He was lucky. 
When John was ready to compete in his next race another water pipe 
broke and this time made his lane wet and not the other lanes. This 
made it difficult for John to race as the slippery and wet conditions 
slowed him down. John lost his race. He was unlucky. 
In both races luck, a lot of luck or not enough luck, made a 
difference in how well John did. 
All four scenarios presented to the students can be found in Appendix C. 
Procedure 
Two visits were made to each of the classes in the four schools which had 
agreed to participate in the study. The purpose of the first visit was to obtain data on 
the global self-concept of all participating students. During this first visit, a copy of 
the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale was distributed to the students, and 
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they were asked to write their name and indicate on the test whether they were male or 
female. The students were then given the following instructions by the researcher: 
In front of you are a set of statements that tell how some people feel 
about themselves. Read each statement and decide whether it 
describes the way you feel about yourself. If it is like you, circle the 
word 'yes' next to the statement. If it is not like you, circle the word 
'no'. Answer every question, even if some are hard to decide. I 
know that everyone feels differently at different times and in 
different situations, but answer each question the way you usually 
feel. Do not circle both 'yes' and 'no' for the same statement. If 
you want to change an answer, cross it out with an X, and circle your 
new answer. Remember that there are no wrong or right answers. 
The students then completed the test individually within a group setting. The 
students were asked to stop and wait following each set of twenty questions until 
further instructions were given to proceed with the next twenty questions. This 
procedure ensured that students did not rush through the test answering thoughtlessly 
and allowed all students to complete the test at the same time. The students took 
approximately twenty minutes to complete the test. The researcher collected the tests 
from all students, ensuring that they had written their name and indicated whether they 
were male or female in the appropriate sections. The results from these tests were used 
to categorise the students into low, middle, and high self-concept groups. A full copy 
of the script used by the researcher in this first visit is shown in Appendix D. 
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The purpose of the second visit was to determine students' attribution 
preferences for their performance on the three problem-solving tasks under 
predetermined conditions. As attribution preferences for an equivocal outcome were 
being investigated, an interrupted task method was developed. This method involved 
the interruption of the high and low self-concept students after two minutes of working 
on a selected problem. While the middle self-concept students were allowed to 
continue for a further one minute, with no group being allowed to complete the task. 
This interrupted task method meant that success and failure outcomes were not 
apparent, and the test measured attributions for an equivocal outcome. It is likely that 
if the students had been all interrupted at the same time, they would have judged the 
reason for their non-completion of the task as being teacher interruption and therefore 
opted for an external cause. The rationale behind the different interruption times was 
that the students would not know why some students were stopped while others were 
not, and therefore would opt for either internal (ability or effort) or external (task 
difficulty or luck) causes when the answering questions related to their performance on 
the problem-solving tasks. 
For this visit, each participant was given a package containing the problem­
solving tasks and response sheets. These packages were coded by the pre-positioning 
of the students' names. Names written on the right-hand side of the page represented 
students who had obtained a low or high self-concept score and names written on the 
left-hand side of the page represented students who had obtained a middle self-concept 
score. This pre-positioning of names enabled the researcher to efficiently identify the 
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correct students to stop at the appropriate times. This discreet method of coding also 
prevented students guessing that they were being deliberately stopped. 
Prior to commencing the problem-solving tasks, the participants were read the 
four short scenarios related to the four causal attributions. Following this, the students 
were instructed as to how they were required to answer the questions that would follow 
the tasks. The students then completed two example questions to check their 
understanding of the magnitude scaling technique. The students were then guided 
through a practice problem to introduce them to the problem-solving tasks. In this 
example, they were presented with a 3 x 3 checkerboard as shown in Figure 4. The 
students were instructed to locate the total number of squares of all sizes in the figure. 
After a square had been located, the students were required to trace around the square 
and then tick a box in a grid under the problem for each square that was found. This 
procedure delayed the students from finishing the problem before being interrupted. 
Following this practice example, each problem-solving task (6 x 6 checkerboards) was 
presented in turn to the students. Students were required to complete these tasks 
individually within a group setting. 
Figure 4. The Problem-Solving Task used for the Practice Task 
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Prior to students commencing the problem-solving tasks the researcher gave 
the following instructions: 
You are now ready for the main problems. One other thing that I 
need to tell you is that when you are working on these problems I 
will be coming around to see how you are going. After I have been 
around to see everyone I will be stopping some of you. If I put a red 
counter (like this one) on your desk I want you to stop working when 
I tell you to. If I tell you to stop, please sit quietly with your arms 
folded. 
A full copy of this script used by the researcher in this visit can be found in 
Appendix E. While the students were working on the selected problem-solving task, 
the researcher walked around the class, and placed a counter on those students' desks 
who were to be interrupted first (i.e., low and high self-concept students). After 
approximately two minutes, the students with red counters on their desks were 
instructed to stop working on the problem and sit quietly and wait. The remaining 
middle self-concept students were instructed to continue working on the problem. 
After a further minute, the researcher asked these students to stop working on the 
problem. All students were then asked to complete the attached eight questions related 
to their performance on this problem. Each of the questions was read to the class by 
the researcher and adequate time was allowed for the students to record their responses 
in the space provided. The researcher then collected the students' responses. This 
procedure was repeated for each of the three problem-solving tasks. 
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At the conclusion of this second visit the researcher explained to the students 
that the reason they were prevented from completing the tasks was not a reflection of 
their abilities, but rather a measure of what they thought of themselves when they were 
interrupted during a task. A copy of the three problem-solving tasks and the solutions 
were distributed to the class teacher for the students to complete at a later date. 
Research Hypotheses 
Three research hypotheses were tested by the present study. First, that there 
would be a significant relationship between global self-concept score and attribution 
preference. Second, that there would be a significant relationship between attribution 
preference and gender. Third, that there would be a significant relationship between 
global self-concept score and gender. For each of these hypotheses an alpha level of 
0.05 was set to show a significant relationship between the variables. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
The results obtained from this study are presented in the body of this chapter. 
The first section outlines the statistical methods used to analyse the data. The 
subsequent sections describe the results from the analyses. Each of these sections 
correspond to a dependent variable. The dependent variables are the four causal 
attributions, ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty, and the independent variables are 
gender and self-concept. The results of the analysis of the relationship between the 
independent variables are then reported. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
findings. 
Method of Data Analysis 
Quantitative statistical analyses were applied to the data collected using the 
statistics package SPSS for Windows Version 7. 5. For all statistical analyses, an alpha 
level of 0.05 was used to test for differences between the means of the relevant 
variables. 
Prior to the analyses, the data collected from seven students were deleted from 
the data set in order to balance the number of participants in the high and low self­
concept groups. Five female and two male students were randomly deleted from the 
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data set. Students who completed only one of the two stages of data collection were 
unable to be included in the analyses. Students who formed the middle self-concept 
group were also not included in the analyses. 
The magnitude scaling technique was used to measure the participants' 
attribution preferences for their performance on the interrupted problem-solving tasks. 
This technique required the participants to draw two lines in response to two questions 
related to each of the four causal attributions. The first line drawn by the participants 
was termed the reference line and the second the response line. The length of each line 
drawn by the participants was measured and recorded in millimetres. The relationship 
of the second line (response line) to the first line (reference line) indicated the relative 
importance of the causal attribution to the participants' performance on the problem­
solving tasks. The participants' raw responses to the attribution questions for the three 
problem-solving tasks were averaged to give a single set of responses for each 
attribution. This transformation was applied to the data before the data were analysed. 
Magnitude scaling is typically analysed by taking the base- 10  logarithm of the 
ratio between the response line and the reference line (Lodge, 1 98 1  ). This was seen to 
more accurately model human responses. However, a more recent method of 
analysing magnitude scaling is to use an ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) design 
(Darlington, 1 990). This was selected as the statistical analysis to test the hypotheses 
related to the four causal attributions. This analysis allows the use of an extraneous 
variable (covariate) to adjust for mean differences on the dependent variable. To 
determine whether the relevant independent variable is having an effect, the influence 
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of the covariate on the dependent variable is statistically controlled for in the analysis 
(Keppel, 1 991). A 2 x 2 ANCOVA was computed on the data. For each of the 
designated attributions, the dependent variable was the length of the response line and 
the covariate was the length of the reference line. 
Results of tests for interaction effects and main effects are reported at every 
level of the analysis. Adjusted means (M) and standard errors (SE) of each causal 
attribution were derived for each level of analysis. The adjusted mean indicates the 
mean value of the attribution for each independent variable adjusted for the covariate. 
The standard error indicates the variability of the mean due to sampling and other 
chance influences (Keppel, 1991 ). 
To validate the ANCOVA, the data were tested for linearity and homogeneity 
of regression slopes. To satisfy the linearity requirements, a linear relationship should 
exist between the dependent variable and the covariate for each group. Homogeneity 
of regression slopes is satisfied if the relationship of the dependent variable to the 
covariate in each group is of approximately the same order (Keppel, 1 99 1  ). Linearity 
was tested by inspection of scatter plots of the reference line (covariate) and the 
response line ( dependent variable) for each independent variable. Homogeneity of 
regression slopes was tested using procedures designated in the SPSS for Windows 
Version 7 .5 package. Scatter plots for the independent variables for each of the causal 
attributions, and the results of the homogeneity tests are shown in Appendix F. 
For the dependent variables which did not satisfy the above requirements, an 
AN OVA (analysis of variance) was used to test the relevant hypotheses. While an 
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ANOVA does not require the same stringent criteria as an ANCOVA, it does not allow 
for an adjustment mechanism (Keppel, 1 991  ). A logarithmic transformation was 
applied to the data prior to the ANOVA being run, in which the base-IO  logarithm of 
the ratio of the response line to the reference line was taken. This transformation 
adjusted the responses to allow for the reference line before the analysis took place. 
For the variables analysed using an ANOVA, results of tests for interaction effects and 
main effects are reported at every level of the analysis and adjusted means (M) and 
standard deviations (SD) were calculated for every level of analysis. 
An independent samples t-test was applied to test the hypothesis that there 
would be a significant relationship between global self-concept score and gender. This 
t-test was used to determine the statistical significance of mean score differences 
between males and females in respect to global self-concept. An alpha level of 0.05 
was set to test for differences between these means. 
The output data for all statistical analyses are presented in Appendix G. 
Ability Attribution 
To validate the use of an ANCOV A for this variable, the data were tested for 
linearity and homogeneity of regression slopes. As the homogeneity of regression 
slopes assumption for this variable was rejected for gender (gender: F [ I ,  56] = 5.049, 
p = .029; self-concept: F [ I ,  56] = 0.585, p = .448), it was appropriate to analyse the 
data using another statistical method. A base- IO logarithmic transformation was 
applied to the data and it was then analysed using an ANOV A. 
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The dependent variable was analysed in relation to the self-concept and gender 
variables. Table 2 shows the adjusted means and standard deviations for the 
interaction of gender and self-concept for this attribution. A graphical display for this 
interaction is presented in Figure 5. 
Table 2. Adjusted Means and Standard Deviations of Gender x Self-Concept for 
Ability Attribution 
SELF-CONCEPT 
Low High 
Female M -0.0203 -0.0070 
SD 0. 156 0.0512 
GENDER 
Male M 0.0575 0.0381 
SD 0.116 0.0823 
The interaction between gender and self-concept was not significant (F [1, 56] 
= 0.335, p = .565). Since this interaction was not significant, the main effects were 
examined without constraint. A marginally higher mean was calculated for 
participants with a low self-concept (M = 0.016, SD = 0. 142) than those with a high 
self-concept (M = 0.014, SD = 2.77) for this attribution. This difference was not 
significant (F [1, 56] = 0.012, p = .914). This finding indicates that there was not 
enough evidence to suggest that high and low self-concept students differ in how they 
attribute their performance to ability on an interrupted task. However, there was a 
significant difference between the responses of males and females for this attribution 
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(F [ l ,  56] = 4.720, p = .034). The mean response of males (M = 0.048, SD = 0.099) 
was higher than that of females (M = -0.014, SD = 0. 11). This finding suggests that 
males more than females attribute their performance to ability on an interrupted task. 
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Figure 5. Adjusted Means for Ability Attribution according to Self-Concept and 
Gender 
Effort Attribution 
For this dependent variable, inspection of the scatter plots of the reference line 
against the response line for each independent variable showed a linear relationship. 
The tests for homogeneity indicated that the regression slopes were homogenous 
(gender: F [ l ,  56] = 0.691, p = .409; self-concept: F [ l ,  56] = 0.043, p = .836). 
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Therefore, the data was analysed using an ANCOV A. The covariate (effort reference 
line) adjusted the dependent variable ( effort response line) for mean differences. 
The dependent variable was analysed in relation to the two independent 
variables, self-concept and gender. The adjusted means and standard errors for the 
interaction of gender and self-concept for this attribution are shown in Table 3. Figure 
6 depicts a graphical display of the data. 
Table 3. Adjusted Means and Standard Errors of Gender x Self-Concept for Effort 
Attribution 
SELF-CONCEPT 
Low High 
Female M 1 1 9.5 1 1 3.6 
SE 6. 1 3  6. 1 0  
GENDER 
Male M 1 00.0 1 1 7.3 
SE 6.52 6.59 
Despite the superficial appearance of an interaction between self-concept and 
gender in Figure 6, an ANCOV A revealed that this interaction was not statistically 
significant (F ( 1 ,  55] = 3.37, p = .072). However, it will be noted that it did approach 
significance (F ( 1 ,  55] = 3.37, p < .08). No significant interactions indicated at this 
level of analysis allowed an unconstrained consideration of the main effects. Analysis 
of the data indicated that participants with a high self-concept had a slightly higher 
status on the response to effort (M = 1 1 5.4, SE = 4.47) than those with a low self-
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concept (M = 109.8, SE = 4.47), however the difference in these means was revealed to 
be non-significant (F [ l ,  55] = 0.804, p = .374). This finding indicates that high and 
low self-concept students do not differ in how they attribute their performance to effort 
on an interrupted task. Females had a higher mean response (M = 116.6, SE = 4.34) 
than males (M = 108.6, SE = 4.64) for this attribution. However, when an ANCOV A 
was applied, it was revealed that this difference was not significant (F [1, 55] = 1 .54, p 
= .220). This finding suggests that on an interrupted task males and females do not 
differ in attributing their performance to effort. 
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Figure 6. Adjusted Means for Effort Attribution according to Self-Concept and 
Gender 
50 
Luck Attribution 
For this dependent variable, observation of the scatter plots of the reference line 
against the response line showed that the relationships were linear, and the tests for 
homogeneity indicated that the regression slopes were homogeneous (gender: F [ 1 ,  56] 
= 0.347, p = .558; self-concept: F [ l ,  56] = 1 .547, p = .21 9). Therefore, the data was 
analysed using an ANCOV A. The reference line for the luck attribution was used as 
the covariate for each analysis, adjusting for mean differences on the dependent 
variable. 
The dependent variable was analysed in respect to the two independent 
variables. Table 4 shows the adjusted means and standard errors for the interaction of 
gender and self-concept for this attribution. 
Table 4. Adjusted Means and Standard Errors of Gender x Self-Concept for Luck 
Attribution 
SELF-CONCEPT 
Low High 
Female M 3 1 .46 32.96 
SE 6.73 6.72 
GENDER 
Male M 4 1 .5 1  40. 1 7  
SE 7.39 7.32 
The test of interaction between self-concept and gender revealed a non-
significant effect (F [ 1 ,  55] = 1 .55, p = .843). The absence of an interaction at this 
5 1  
level of analysis allowed the main effects to be examined without concern for higher­
order complication. The difference in mean scores between the low (M = 36.5, SE = 
4.97) and high (M = 36.6, SE = 4.97) self-concept participants for this attribution was 
very small, and was not statistically significant (F [ 1 ,  55] = 0.00, p = .991). This 
finding indicates that high and low self-concept students do not differ in attributing 
their performance to luck on an interrupted task. Although males (M = 40.8, SE = 
5.09) had a higher mean response than did females (M = 32.2, SE = 4.76) for this 
attribution, a non-reliable difference in means was revealed after an ANCOV A was 
applied (F [ l ,  55] = 0.04, p = .221). This finding suggests that males and females do 
not differ in attributing their performance to luck on an interrupted task. 
Task Difficulty Attribution 
Linearity of the data for this dependent variable was satisfied by the inspection 
of the scatter plots of the reference line against the response line for each independent 
variable. The data was also shown to be homogeneous when tested (gender: F [ 1 ,  56] 
= 0.01 3, p =  .99 1 ;  self-concept: F [ 1 ,  56] = 0. 1 28, p = .772). Therefore, an ANCOVA 
was used to analysed the data. The reference line for the task difficulty attribution 
used as the covariate to adjust for mean differences on the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable was analysed in relation to self-concept and gender. 
Table 5 shows the adjusted means and standard errors for the interaction of gender and 
self-concept for this attribution. 
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Table 5. Adjusted Means and Standard Errors of Gender x Self-Concept for Task 
Difficulty Attribution 
SELF-CONCEPT 
Low High 
Female M 94.08 82.25 
SE 5.06 5.06 
GENDER 
Male M 80.57 83.79 
SE 5.40 5.40 
The interaction between gender and self-concept was revealed to be non-
significant (F (1, 55] = 2.08, p = .155), allowing the main effects of gender and self­
concept to be examined without constraint. The main effect for self-concept for this 
attribution was not significant (F (1, 55] = 0.66, p = .419), with low self-concept 
participants exhibiting a slightly higher mean response (M = 86.3, SE = 3.71) than the 
high self-concept participants (M = 83.0, SE = 3.71). This finding indicates that high 
and low self-concept students do not differ in how they attribute their performance to 
task difficulty on an interrupted task. Although females had a slightly higher mean 
response (M = 88.2, SE = 3.56) than did males (M = 82.2, SE = 3.81) for this 
attribution, an ANCOV A revealed that this difference was not statistically significant 
(F (1, 55] = 1.32 p = .256). This finding suggests that on an interrupted task males and 
females do not differ in attributing their performance to task difficulty. 
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Global Self-Concept and Gender 
Global self-concept was compared to gender using an independent samples t-
test. The means and standard deviations of self-concept score for males and females 
are indicated in Table 6. The application of a t-test to this data revealed that there was 
no significant difference between these mean scores (t [58] = 0.31, p = .760). This 
finding suggests that males and females do not differ in regards to global self-concept 
as measured by the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale. 
Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Concept for Gender 
GENDER 
Female 
Male 
Summary 
M 
57.81 
59.00 
SD 
15.59 
14.42 
The present study tested three hypotheses. First, that there would be a 
significant relationship between global self-concept score and attribution preference. 
Second, that there would be a significant relationship between attribution preference 
and gender. Third, that there would be a significant relationship between global self­
concept score and gender. The results obtained by the present study are summarised 
below. 
The dependent variables for the first and second hypotheses in the present 
study were the four causal attributions, ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty. The 
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data collected for these dependent variables were analysed in relation to the 
independent variables, self-concept and gender. The absence of any interactions at this 
level of analysis allowed the main effects to be considered without constraint. 
Analysis of the first dependent variable, ability, revealed that there were no 
significant difference in how high and low self-concept students attribute their 
performance on an interrupted task to this attribution. However, a significant 
difference was revealed between the responses of males and females, indicating a 
gender main effect. It was shown that on an interrupted task males more than females 
attribute their performance to ability. 
Analysis of the three remaining dependent variables ( effort, luck, and task 
difficulty) revealed that low and high self-concept students do not differ in how they 
attribute their performance on an interrupted task to any of these attributions. 
Similarly, a gender difference was not apparent, suggesting that males and females 
also do not differ in attributing their performance to effort, luck, and task difficulty on 
an interrupted task. 
Finally, the third hypothesis that there would be a significant relationship 
between global self-concept score and gender was tested. No significant difference 
was found between the mean scores of males and females on the Piers-Harris 
Children's Self-Concept Scale. This finding suggests that males and females do not 
differ in regards to global self-concept. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between global self­
concept and attribution preference in primary school students. The relationships of 
gender to global self-concept and gender to attribution preference were also examined. 
The findings of the present study as they correspond to the three research questions 
stated in Chapter One are discussed in this chapter. The limitations of this study and 
suggestions for future research are also discussed. The chapter concludes with the 
implications of the findings for educational practice. 
Global Self-Concept and Attribution Preference 
The main research question posed by this study was: What is the relationship 
between global self-concept and attribution preference in selected groups of primary­
aged children? The present study revealed that high and low self-concept students do 
not differ in attributing their performance on an interrupted task to any of the four 
causal attributions (ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty). This study is one of the 
first to determine students' attribution preferences for a task with an equivocal 
outcome. Previous research studies have tended to measure individuals' attribution 
preferences for tasks with success and failure outcomes. The present study is more 
applicable to classroom settings, where equivocal outcomes are commonly 
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experienced. No published research studies were found that examined the relationship 
between global self-concept and attribution preference for an equivocal outcome. As 
such, caution is necessary in comparing the findings of the present study with those of 
previous studies. 
The lack of a substantive relationship between global self-concept and 
attribution preference in the present study is contrary to the findings of a number of 
previous studies that have shown a significant relationship between these variables. 
Fitch (1970) showed that low self-concept individuals attribute failure to internal 
causes more than high self-concept individuals. Ames and Felker (1979) also found a 
relationship between self-concept and attribution preference, but with a difference in 
how high and low self-concept individuals attribute causes to success. In particular, 
their study found that high self-concept individuals internalise their success more than 
low self-concept individuals. Madonna, Bailey and Wesley (1990) found that 
individuals with a high self-concept attribute their success and failure more to internal 
causes, whereas low self-concept individuals attribute their success and failure more to 
external causes. 
A possible explanation for the lack of a substantive relationship between global 
self-concept and attribution preference in the present study may be due to the different 
perceptions held by low and high self-concept participants of the task interruption. It 
could be hypothesised that participants with a low self-concept would be more likely 
to view the interruption of the task as a failure. On the contrary, participants with a 
high self-concept may view the interruption as a success. If the general findings of 
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previous research are accepted, that is, high self-concept individuals attribute success 
to internal causes (ability and effort) and failure to external causes (task difficulty and 
luck) and vice versa for low self-concept individuals, then both low and high self­
concept participants in the present study would attribute their performance for the 
interrupted task to internal causes. This would explain the lack of significant 
differences between the attribution preferences of high and low self-concept students 
and the relatively high mean attribution scores for ability and effort compared with 
task difficulty and luck in the present study. 
There are notable differences in the tasks and measurement devices used to 
measure participants' attribution preferences in previous studies. Fitch (1970) required 
participants to complete a dot-estimation task. Participants' attribution preferences for 
this task were measured by their completion of a questionnaire that allowed them to 
distribute causality for their performance over four possible causes. In the study 
conducted by Ames and Felker (1979), participants were randomly given six puzzles to 
complete. Participants indicated their attribution preferences for their performance on 
these tasks using a pie-graph device. Madonna, Bailey and Wesley (1990) measured 
participants' attribution preferences for success and failure by their completion of the 
Nowicki-Strickland Children's Locus of Control scale. 
It is likely that the tasks employed in these studies and the measuring devices 
of attribution preferences would affect the causal attributions chosen by individuals. 
For example, the type of task (e.g., mathematical, comprehension) and the context in 
which the task is performed (e.g., degree of competitiveness, novelty of the task, 
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versus private reporting of task outcomes and attributions) may affect attribution 
choices. The measuring devices in previous studies and the number and type of 
attribution choices available from these instruments vary widely. The use of the 
magnitude scaling technique and all four causal attributions in the present study is an 
improvement on previous studies. This measuring device provided the students with 
almost unlimited opportunity to respond with regards to their attribution preferences. 
The task employed in the present study and the equivocal outcome obtained are more 
similar to school-type tasks than those used in previous studies. As such, the task and 
measurement device used in this study, with some refinement and testing, could 
become an extremely effective tool for measuring students' attribution preferences. 
In summary, the present study found that high and low self-concept students do 
not differ in respect to their attribution preferences for an interrupted task. This 
finding suggests that global self-concept is not predictive of differences in students' 
attribution preferences for an equivocal outcome. This study did not consider a 
multifaceted-hierarchal model of self-concept. However, many researchers in this field 
(e.g., Hattie, 1992; Marsh & Shavelson, 1995) support the claim that specific facets of 
self-concept may become more or less important when compared to similar constructs. 
In this study, measures of academic self-concept may have shown more significant 
findings. 
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Gender Differences in Attribution Preference 
The second research question posed by the present study was: Is there a 
difference in attribution preference between males and females? The present study 
found that males more than females attribute their performance on an interrupted task 
to ability. No other gender differences in attribution preference were found. As stated 
in the previous section, the present study measured students' attribution preferences for 
an equivocal outcome whereas previous studies have focused on measuring students' 
attribution preferences for success and failure outcomes. Due to this difference in task 
outcomes, caution is necessary in comparing the findings of the present study with 
those of previous studies. 
The findings of the present study are in accord with previous studies that have 
shown that males and females do differ in attributing their performance to ability. As 
the present study did not determine whether the participants perceived the interruption 
of the problem-solving task as a success or failure, the present study's findings support 
those of other research studies which have found that males more than females 
attribute either their success or failure on a task to ability. Burgner and Hewstone 
( 1 993) conducted a study which revealed that males attribute their success to ability 
more than females. In this study, the participants were presented with two tasks, one 
that was easy and which all participants successfully completed, and one that was 
difficult and which no participants successfully completed. Open-ended questions 
were then used to measure participants' attribution preferences for these two tasks. 
Wigfield (1 988) found that males on a memory task attribute failure more to lack of 
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specific ability than females. Participants' attribution preferences in this study were 
measured by their rating of the importance of a number of reasons for their 
performance. 
The finding of the present study that males more than females attribute their 
performance on an interrupted task to ability conflicts with the findings of Nicholls 
(1975) and Cooper, Burger and Good (1981). Nicholls (1975) found that females 
attribute failure to low ability more than success to high ability, however males do not. 
In his study, an angle matching task was given to participants followed by false 
performance feedback. A pie-graph device was then used to measure participants' 
attribution preferences for their success or failure on this task. Cooper, Burger and 
Good (1981) found that females take more responsibility than males on academic 
outcomes. In their study, the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire 
was used to gauge participants' locus of control beliefs. 
As with studies that have examined the relationship between global self-
concept and attribution preference, various tasks and measurement devices have been 
used in the research studies cited in this section to measure the attribution preferences 
of individuals. It is likely that these different methods will influence participants' 
attribution choices. Notably, previous studies that are supported by the finding of the 
present study that males more than females attribute their performance to ability have 
also used problem-solving tasks similar to those used in a classroom setting. 
The present study found no significant differences between males and females 
in their preference for any of the other causal attributions ( effort, luck, and task 
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difficulty). This finding supports the findings of Burgner and Hewstone (1993), who 
also showed no gender differences for any causal attribution other than ability. It is, 
however, contrary to the findings of a number of other studies in this field that have 
shown a significant relationship between gender and attribution preference. Nicholls 
(1975) showed that males more than females attribute their failure to bad luck. 
Similarly, Wigfield (1988) found that males make more negative attributions than 
females by attributing their failure more to lack of interest and their success more to 
task ease. 
Overall, the findings from the present study question the assumptions of the 
three models (i.e., general externality, low expectancy, and self derogation) that have 
been proposed to explain gender differences in attribution preference. However, an 
alternative model suggested by Sweeney, Moreland and Gruber (1982) is supported by 
the present study's finding that males more than females attribute their performance on 
an interrupted task to ability. This model states that males exhibit a general internality 
bias as opposed to females displaying a general externality bias. The proponents of 
this model claim that males tend to attribute their performance more to internal causes 
(ability and effort) because they are more socialised to acknowledge personal 
responsibility for their outcomes. 
In summary, it appears from the findings of the present study that there are few 
gender differences in attribution preference for an equivocal outcome. This study 
found that males and females only differ in attributing their performance on an 
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interrupted task to ability. Specifically, this study found that males attribute their 
performance on an interrupted task more to ability than females. 
Gender Differences in Global Self-Concept 
The third research question posed by the present study was: Is there a 
difference in global self-concept between males and females? While it is theorised that 
males have a higher global self-concept than females, few empirical studies have 
supported this theory, and when a significant difference between the mean scores of 
males and females on a global self-concept measure has been found, this difference is 
usually small in magnitude (e.g., Alpert-Gillis & Connell, 1 989; O'Brien, 1 991). 
The present study replicates the findings of many previous studies that have 
found no significant difference between the mean scores of males and females on a 
global self-concept measure. Hattie and Mclnman ( 1991), in their meta-analysis of 77 
studies that compared gender to self-concept, found that there was no overall 
relationship between gender and global self-concept. Wylie (1 979), in her review of 
47 studies into the relationship between self-concept and gender, similarly found that 
non-significant relationships dominated findings. The findings of the present study are 
also consistent with those of a number of other research studies that have examined 
gender differences in global self-concept. These include studies by DeVoe ( 1977), 
Ketcham and Snyder ( 1 977), Moyal ( 1 977), and Piers and Harris ( 1 964 ), all of which 
were unable to report a significant difference in the global self-concepts of males and 
females. 
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Gender differences in specific facets of self-concept were not a consideration 
for this study. However, such differences, if they do exist, may be obscured when 
items on a self-concept scale are summed to obtain a global self-concept. Many 
previous studies (e.g., Marsh, 1984; Mboya & Mwamwenda, 1996) based on a 
multifaceted-hierarchal approach to self-concept have found gender differences in 
specific facets of self-concept. From an extensive review of research into the 
relationship between gender and self-concept, Marsh (1989) suggested that there 
appears to be a pattern of gender differences favouring males for math and physical 
self-concept and favouring females for verbal and social self-concept. He concluded 
that there are small gender effects favouring males for total self-concept measures. He 
also concluded that there appear to be larger, counterbalancing gender differences in 
more specific facets of self-concept that are generally consistent with gender 
stereotypes. 
In summary, the present study indicates that males and females display similar 
levels of global self-concept on the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale. This 
finding is consistent with those of many previous studies in this field, leading to the 
cogent conclusion that gender is not a mediator for global self-concept. Once again, a 
multifaceted-hierarchal model of self-concept may have shown more significant 
findings in this study. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study was conducted with 82 year seven students from four Perth 
metropolitan schools within similar socio-economic areas. The findings from this 
study cannot be readily generalised to students of a different age group, socio­
economic status, or geographic location. 
The present study is one of the first to measure students' attribution preferences 
for a task with an equivocal outcome. The technique used to measure the participants' 
attribution preferences in this study has not yet been validated against other measures 
that also claim to measure individuals' attribution preferences and this presents some 
technical limitations. The findings of this study are also, to an extent, limited by the 
selection of task. This study did not assess participants' familiarity of the problem­
solving task and this may pose some limitations on the findings, given that some 
researchers (e.g., Langer, 1 978) claim that novelty of a task may affect attribution 
choice. The task employed in this study may also have influenced the attribution 
preferences of males and females, as it has been shown that males have higher 
expectations for success than females on visual-spatial tasks (Gitelson, Peterson & 
Tobin-Richards, 1 982). 
The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale was used in the present study 
to measure participants' levels of global self-concept. While it is generally agreed that 
self-concept can best be measured by statements that reflect the self-worth, personal 
competence, and achievement ideals or aspirations of individuals (Gilberts, 1 983), the 
self-report technique does have its detractors. The major critics of this technique ( e.g., 
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Cattell, 1946; Coombs, Soper, & Courson, 1963; Edwards, 1957, 1990) argue that 
what individuals report about the self is not necessarily an accurate representation of 
the self-concept. The self-report is only what individuals are willing to and able to 
disclose to someone else. For example, there is a tendency for people to provide 
information about themselves that they perceive to be socially desirable rather than 
display their true thoughts or feelings (Burns, 1979). Consequently, scores on the 
Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale are subject to conscious and unconscious 
distortions by respondents, usually in the direction of more socially desirable 
responses. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several issues that need to be addressed if further advancement is to 
be made in researching the relationship between global self-concept and attribution 
preference in individuals. These issues fundamentally relate to the reliability and 
validity of measurement techniques employed in this field. 
A variety of tasks and measurement techniques have been developed by 
researchers in an attempt to measure the attribution preferences of individuals. Some 
of the tasks used in previous studies have varied between solving anagrams ( e.g., Bar­
Tal & Frieze, 1977), matching angles ( e.g., Nicholls, 1975), solving logical and 
mathematical problems (e.g., Feldman-Summers & Kiesler, 1974), and the use of 
hypothetical settings (e.g., Croxton & Klonsky, 1982). However, little indication of 
the appropriateness of these tasks was made in the studies. The task itself (e.g., 
gender-stereotyped tasks), and the context in which the task is performed (e.g., the 
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novelty of a task, degree of competitiveness, public versus private reporting of 
outcome and attribution preference) may influence the types of attributions individuals 
make. More effort needs to be made in making the task suitable and impartial within 
the context in which it is to be applied. Measurement techniques in previous studies 
have also varied widely, ranging from rating scales (e.g., Wigfield, 1988) and 
percentage ratings (e.g., Ames & Felker, 1979) to open-ended questioning (e.g., 
Burgner & Hewstone, 1993). However, many of these measures remam largely 
untested for reliability or validity. Future research in this field should focus on the 
technical adequacy of these measures. It would be more appropriate to devise a small 
number of measurement instruments with acceptable levels of reliability and validity 
against which new measures can be accurately tested. 
There is also a need for research into the validity and reliability of self-concept 
measures. Improvements to the measures of self-concept should take similar lines to 
those proposed for the measurement of attribution preferences, with the development 
of a small number of valid and reliable measures. Future measurement devices should 
be based on more clearly articulated and justifiable theoretical models. Increasing and 
evaluating the validity of self-concept measures could also be achieved by more 
sophisticated application of item analyses, factor analyses, multitrait-multimethod 
matrices, and techniques for evaluating and minimising the possibly irrelevant 
responses or score determiners that can decrease construct validity (Wylie, 1989). 
Improving the reliability and validity of the devices that measure self-concept 
and attribution preferences will benefit future research that examines the relationship 
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between these variables. Improved measures should result in more consistent findings 
from which more accurate conclusions regarding this relationship can be made. 
By taking into account certain situational variables, further advancement may 
also be made in examining the relationship between global self-concept and attribution 
preference in individuals. The placement of individuals in artificial task settings in 
which the researcher defines or manipulates the task outcome may result in a distorted 
or an inaccurate view of attribution patterns. Previous studies have also tended to 
measure individuals' attribution preferences for one particular type of task or problem. 
This has prevented any sound conclusions being made about the general tendencies 
that characterise the attribution patterns of high and low self-concept individuals. 
Studying the spontaneous attribution preferences of individuals in multiple contexts 
and for self-chosen tasks would be more appropriate. 
Future research should also focus on refining the procedure used to measure the 
attribution preferences of participants in the present study. The use of the interrupted 
task procedure attempted to produce a situation in which success and failure were not 
apparent, and students could make their own assessment of their performance on the 
problem-solving task. This procedure allowed students to make a personal judgment 
of their success or failure. Examining individuals' actual perceptions of the task 
interruption should be a focus for future research. As well as this, replication of this 
study with a larger population and testing the measure used in this study against other 
measures in this field for reliability and validity is required. 
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There is an increasing acceptance of the multifaceted-hierarchal approach to 
self-concept among contemporary theorists (e.g., Marsh, 1 984; Shavelson, Hubner, & 
Stanton, 1 976). This approach may be more useful in detecting relationships between 
self-concept and other variables. Measures of academic self-concept, for example, 
may be more appropriate to use in detecting a relationship between self-concept and 
attribution preference for academic outcomes. 
The research agenda outlined in this section provides a rich foundation upon 
which educational researchers can build conceptualisations about the relationship 
between self-concept and attribution preference in individuals. Past research has 
furthered educators' understandings, and it is likely that there will be many more such 
developments. Perhaps research more grounded in theory and methodologically 
improved will offer deeper insights into this relationship. 
Conclusion 
This study has initiated a new field of research into attribution theory. Very 
little research has been conducted into the measurement of students' attribution 
preferences for tasks with an equivocal outcome. Previous studies have tended to 
measure students' attribution preferences for tasks with success and failure outcomes, 
however, this is not necessarily typical of outcomes experienced in real-life. As stated 
earlier in this chapter, the present study is more applicable to classroom settings where 
equivocal outcomes are commonly experienced. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the findings of this study. The 
foremost is that global self-concept is not predictive of differences in students' 
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attribution preferences for an equivocal outcome. Contemporary self-concept theorists 
(e.g., Hattie, 1 992; Marsh & Shavelson, 1 995) tend to agree that a multifaceted­
hierarchal approach to self-concept is more valid in detecting relationships between 
self-concept and other variables. Further research into the relationship of attribution 
preference for an equivocal outcome and more applicable facets of self-concept, such 
as academic, may provide more telling results in the future. 
A second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that males more than 
females attribute their performance for an equivocal outcome to ability. This finding 
supports the theory that males are more internal in their attributions than females by 
taking more responsibility for their task outcomes (Sweeney, et al., 1982). 
The final conclusion from this study is that gender is not a mediator for global 
self-concept. It would seem that the findings of both the present study and previous 
studies in this field do not support the theory that males have a higher global self­
concept than females. Once again, a multifaceted-hierarchal approach may be more 
appropriate for detecting gender differences in self-concept. 
The present study has important implications for educational settings. As noted 
in Chapter One, actual perceptions of success and failure differ from student to student, 
are consequent of reaching or not reaching a goal, and are not necessarily relative to an 
achieved grade or score. As well as this, school tasks are often left ungraded or 
unfinished. Therefore, equivocal outcomes are more typical of many school-type 
tasks, and research into students' attribution preferences for these outcomes is highly 
relevant to understanding students' learning and behaviour in the classroom. 
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In light of the present research, it appears that teachers cannot make 
judgements about students' attribution preferences for an equivocal outcome based on 
a global self-concept score. This study did not examine the effects of specific facets of 
self-concept on students' attribution preferences and did not determine students' actual 
perceptions of the task interruption. Investigation of these issues may further clarify 
the relationship between self-concept and attribution preference for an equivocal 
outcome. This study does however, provide a solid basis and raise some interesting 
questions for future research. 
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Appendix A 
Parent Consent Form and Teacher Information Sheet 
The consent letter given to the students' parents and the information sheet for 
the class teachers are shown on the following pages. 
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Dear Parent/Guardian, 
I am a qualified primary teacher. I am currently doing project work on problem­
solving in year seven classes. I am visiting schools in the metropolitan area. 
I will be working with your child's class in the near future. A short, twenty-minute 
questionnaire will be given to the children, followed by three problem-solving 
activities. These will be completed as a whole class and take no longer than one hour 
of class time. Children generally enjoy these activities. I know that the information 
gathered from these activities will be of benefit to teachers and students in schools. 
Any further queries regarding this study can be directed to me on (08) 9123 4567. I 
will be happy to answer any questions. Thank you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Carolyn Moore 
Honours Student - Faculty of Education 
Edith Cowan University 
---:}<:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have read the information above and understand my child's role as a participant in 
the study. I give consent for my child (name) to be 
included in the questionnaire and the problem-solving activities. I understand that 
my child's name will not be used in any publication of this work. 
Parent/Guardian's Name 
Parent/Guardian's Signature 
Date 
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INFORMATION SHEET FOR TEACHERS 
NAME: Carolyn Moore 
CONTACT NUMBER: (08) 9 123 4567 
QUALIFICATIONS: Bachelor of Arts (Primary Education) at Edith Cowan University. 
COURSE: Bachelor of Education (Honours) at Edith Cowan University. 
RESEARCH TITLE: The Relationship between Global Self-Concept and Attribution 
Preference in Primary School Students. 
RESEARCH AIM: To determine the extent of the relationship between how students feel 
about themselves (their self-concept) and what students attribute their performance on a 
problem-solving task to (i.e., their ability, their effort, luck, or difficulty of the task). 
RESEARCH METHOD: Two sessions are required to collect the information needed to 
examine the above relationship. An outline of these two sessions is provided below. 
Session I 
The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale will be used to gather information regarding 
students' levels of self-concept. This test consists of 80 yes/no items. The items are written 
as simple declarative statements, for example "I am unpopular" and "I have good ideas". 
Students, within a group setting, will complete the test (in written form) individually. 
Session 2 
Students will be required to attempt three similar problem-solving tasks. A simple version of 
this problem can be seen below. 
How many squares of all sizes are on the checkerboard below? 
The students will be divided into two groups ( depending on the score they obtain on the self­
concept test), and each group interrupted at different times during each problem. The 
students will then be asked to complete a short questionnaire, which aims to determine what 
they attribute their performance to for these tasks. 
Following these tasks, the students will be assured that the reason that they were interrupted 
was not due to their abilities. 
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH: The information gathered from this study will be of 
benefit to teachers and students in schools. This study aims to provide teachers with a better 
understanding of the terms attribution theory and self-concept and how they are inter-related. 
As well as this, the study will focus on the importance of these concepts in the context of the 
classroom. 
I would like to thank your school, the teachers and the students for taking the time to 
participate in this study. Your enthusiasm and cooperation play a vital role in making this 
study possible. My sincere thanks, Carolyn Moore. 
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Appendix B 
Problem Solving Tasks and Response Sheets 
The problem solving tasks and response sheets used to measure the students' 
attribution preferences are shown on the following pages. 
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How Many Squares? 
How many squares of all sizes are on the checkerboard below? 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO. 
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1 A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
d ifference in how well a student does this problem? 
• 
1 8. How much do you think that luck made a d ifference in how well you did 
this problem? 
• 
2A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' ability 
makes a d ifference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
28. How much do you think that your ability made a d ifference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
3A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' effort 
makes a difference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
38. How much do you think that your effort made a d ifference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
4A. How much would a teacher at this school think that the difficulty of this 
problem (easy or hard) makes a d ifference in how well a student does 
this problem? 
• 
48. How much do you think that the difficulty of this problem (easy or hard) 
made a d ifference in how well you did this problem? 
• 
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How Many Squares? 
How many squares of all sizes are on the checkerboard below? 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO. 
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1A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does this problem? 
• 
1 8. How much do you think that luck made a d ifference in how well you did 
this problem? 
• 
2A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' ability 
makes a d ifference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
28. How much do you think that your  ability made a d ifference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
3A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' effort 
makes a d ifference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
38. How much do you think that your effort made a d ifference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
4A. How much would a teacher at this school think that the d ifficulty of this 
problem (easy or hard) makes a d ifference in how well a student does 
this problem? 
• 
48. How much do you think that the d ifficulty of this problem (easy or hard) 
made a difference in how well you did this problem? 
• 
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How Many Squares? 
How many squares of all sizes are on the checkerboard below? 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO. 
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1A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does this problem? 
• 
18. How much do you think that luck made a difference in how well you did 
this problem? 
• 
2A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' ability 
makes a difference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
28. How much do you think that your ability made a difference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
3A. How much would a teacher at this school think that students' effort 
makes a difference in how well they do this problem? 
• 
38. How much do you think that your effort made a difference in how well 
you did this problem? 
• 
4A. How much would a teacher at this school think that the difficulty of this 
problem (easy or hard) makes a difference in how well a student does 
this problem? 
• 
48. How much do you think that the difficulty of this problem (easy or hard) 
made a difference in how well you did this problem? 
• 
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Appendix C 
Attribution Scenarios 
Luck Attribution 
John was competing in a running race. The lanes next to him had been wet by 
a broken water pipe. This made these lanes very slippery and difficult to run fast. 
John's lane was dry and this allowed him to run a lot faster than his other opponents. 
John won his race. He was lucky. 
When John was ready to compete in his next race another water pipe broke 
and this time made his lane wet and not the other lanes. This made it difficult for 
John to race as the slippery and wet conditions slowed him down. John lost his race. 
He was unlucky. 
In both races luck, a lot of luck or not enough luck, made a difference in how 
well John did. 
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Ability Attribution 
Jane has always been a fast runner. On the sports carnival day she won every 
race she entered, because of her ability to run fast. 
Mary has never been good at running. Every time Mary competes in a 
running race she always comes last. This is because Mary doesn't have much ability 
at running. 
In both races ability, high ability or low ability, made a difference in how well 
each student did. 
Effort Attribution 
When Paul competes in running races he usually finishes somewhere in the 
middle of the group. Paul decided that in the next running race that he would really 
try hard to win. This time Paul put all of his effort in to the race and came first. 
Ryan is in year 6. He always finishes in the top three. Ryan decided that in 
the final running race for the day that he couldn't be bothered to try hard and 
therefore did not put any effort into the race. He finished last. 
In both races effort, a lot of effort or not enough effort, made a difference in 
how well each student did. 
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Task Difficulty Attribution 
Lisa and Sarah also run in the school races. They first ran a short, easy race 
and finished closely at the top of the bunch. The teacher then said she was going to 
give a harder race. She asked the students to run around the oval three times. In this 
race Sarah and Lisa became tired after the first lap and did not run so well. They 
finished in the middle of the bunch. 
In this case the difficulty of the task, how easy or hard it was, made a 
difference in how well the students did. 
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Appendix D 
Researcher's Script for First Visit 
Introduction & Instruction 
Good morning everyone. My name is Miss Moore. I am a visiting teacher to 
your school, and some time next week, I will be coming in to do some problem­
solving activities with you. Today I wanted to come in to introduce myself to you, 
and to get to know your class a little better. 
To help me get to know you, I would like you to answer some questions about 
yourself. These require yes/no answers, and shouldn't take more than about twenty 
minutes. What is important is that your answers to these questions should show what 
you feel, not what you think your friends feel, or what you think I might want to hear. 
At the top of the page, where it says 'Name', I would like you to print your 
name and indicate whether you are male or female by circling either 'boy' or 'girl' 
and then sit quietly with your arms folded and wait for further instructions. 
Hand out self-concept tests. 
In front of you are a set of statements that tell how some people feel about 
themselves. Read each statement and decide whether it describes the way you feel 
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about yourself. If it is like you, circle the word 'yes' next to the statement. If it is not 
like you, circle the word 'no' . Answer every question, even if some are hard to 
decide. I know that everyone feels differently at different times and in different 
situations, but answer each question the way you usually feel. Do not circle both 
'yes' and 'no' for the same statement. If you want to change an answer, cross it out 
with an X, and circle your new answer. Remember that there are no wrong or right 
answers. 
After every twenty questions, there is a dotted line. When you get to each 
line, I would like you to sit quietly with your arms folded. When everyone has 
finished each set of questions, we will go on to the next twenty. That way, everyone 
will finish together. 
Are there any questions about what you have to do? 
If anyone has any questions while you are working, please raise your hand 
and I will come around. You may begin. Remember to take your time and think 
carefully about the answers you give, be honest with your answers, and keep your 
eyes on your own work. 
Participants complete the Piers-Harris Children 's Self-Concept Scale 
individually, but within a group setting. Researcher supervises, responding to any 
queries. 
96 
Conclusion 
Researcher collects self-concept tests, ensuring that the participants ' names 
have been written on the tests. 
Thank you all for filling out your answers to these questions. You have been 
a very good class, and I look forward to working with you all again next week. 
Note - Italicised text = researcher's or participants' actions. 
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Appendix E 
Researcher's Script for Second Visit 
Introduction 
Good morning everyone. Last week I got you to answer some questions 
about how you felt about yourself. Today we will be doing some problem-solving 
activities. This time I want to find out how you feel about how well you do these 
problems. I will give you one problem at a time and then be asking you to answer 
some questions about how well you did. It is very important that you listen carefully 
to the instructions that I give. 
Attribution Scenarios 
I'd first like you to listen to some short stories about some year seven students 
that I know. When I read you these stories I want you to think very carefully about 
four things and what they mean: luck, ability, effort, and task difficulty. 
Show first and second overhead, read stories - emphasising the four 
attributes. 
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First Practice Question 
I will now go through how I'd like you to do answer the questions that I will 
be giving you at the end of each problem. 
Let's take a very simple question (show third overhead -first example). Read 
first question. Demonstrate answer to question - more or less (story of Michael and 
Rebecca). Now I want you to have a go at drawing your own lines 
(Distribute first page of handout, students complete first practice question). 
(Have a look around). Excellent, you've really been concentrating. Great, 
pens down and eyes to me. 
Second Practice Question 
Now let's have look at another practice question (show third overhead -
second example). Read second question. Demonstrate answer to question - more or 
less. Now I want you to have a go at drawing your own lines for the second question 
on your hand-out 
(Have a look around). That's great. I can see that you are all ready to start 
the problems. I need to have everyone's attention - so eyes to me. 
Practice Problem 
The problems I will be giving you will be checkerboards like this one (show 
fourth overhead). I will be asking you to count the number of squares in the 
99 
checkerboard. It is not just the lx l  squares, but also the 2x2 squares and the 3x3 
squares. This is a practice problem to begin with. 
What I would like you to do is to trace around each square using a pencil (like 
this) and then tick a box for each square you find. I want you to find as many squares 
as you can before I stop you. 
I will show you the correct answer for this practice problem. Demonstrate 
solution. Highlight that there are more boxes then the answer to the problem. Are 
there any questions about what you have to do? 
You are now ready for the main problems. One other thing that I need to tell 
you is that when you are working on these problems I will be coming around to see 
how you are going. After I have been around to see everyone I will be stopping some 
of you. If I put a red counter (like this one) on your desk I want you to stop working 
when I tell you to. If I tell you to stop, please sit quietly with your arms folded. 
Main Problems 
I will now hand out the first problem. Please do not pick up a pen until I tell 
you to start. (hand out problems). You may begin. 
Researcher walks around the class. Hand out red counters to selected 
students (low and high self-concept participants). Stop students with counters after 2 
minutes. Stop remaining students after a farther 1 minute. 
Excellent, let's have a go at answering the questions. I will read each of the 
questions to you and give everyone time to answer. After you have answered a 
question I would like you to sit quietly with your eyes to me so that I know that you 
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are ready for the next question. It is important that you do not go ahead with another 
question until I have read it to you. Answer the questions on your own and think 
very carefully about your answer, giving it like you did before with the straight lines. 
Remember to wait until I have read each question before answering it. Now turn 
over to the next page. (Read the first question - repeat for all questions). Repeat 
procedure for each problem. Researcher collects problems. 
Conclusion 
Thank you very much year 7' s for listening carefully to my instructions and 
for your participation. Even though I stopped some of you and let others continue 
today it wasn't because you were not doing the right thing or that you weren't good 
enough - in fact you were all very good. What I wanted to find out was how you felt 
about how well you did on a problem when you were interrupted part way through. 
Because we didn't get enough time to complete the problems I will leave a copy of 
the problems and the answers with your teacher for you to complete later. Thanks 
again, you have been a wonderful class. 
Note - Italicised print = researcher's or participants' actions. 
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Overheads 
First Overhead - Attribution Scenarios 
Luck 
John was competing in a running race. The lanes next to him had been 
wet by a broken water pipe. This made these lanes very slippery and 
difficult to run fast. John's lane was dry and this allowed him to run a lot 
faster than his other opponents. John won his race. He was lucky. 
When John was ready to compete in his next race another water pipe 
broke and this time made his lane wet and not the other lanes. This 
made it difficult for John to race as the slippery and wet conditions 
slowed him down . John lost his race. He was unlucky. 
In  both races luck, a lot of luck or not enough luck, made a difference in 
how well John did. 
Abi l ity 
Jane has always been a fast runner. On the sports carnival day she 
won every race she entered, because of her ability to run fast. 
Mary has never been good at running . Every time Mary competes in a 
running race she always comes last. This is because Mary doesn't 
have much ability at running. 
In  both races abi lity, high ability or low ability, made a difference in how 
well each student did. 
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Second Overhead - Attribution Scenarios 
Effort 
When Paul competes in running races he usually finishes somewhere 
in the middle of the group. Paul decided that in the next running race 
that he would really try hard to win .  This time Paul put all of his effort in 
to the race and came first. 
Ryan is in year 6. He always finishes in the top three. Ryan decided 
that in the final running race for the day that he couldn't be bothered to 
try hard and therefore did not put any effort into the race. He finished 
last. 
In both races effort, a lot of effort or not enough effort, made a 
difference in how well each student did. 
Task Difficulty 
Lisa and Sarah also run in the school races. They first ran a short, 
easy race and finished closely at the top of the bunch. The teacher 
then said she was going to give a harder race. She asked the students 
to run around the oval three times. In this race Sarah and Lisa became 
tired after the first lap and did not run so well .  They finished in the 
middle of the bunch. 
In this case the difficulty of the task, how easy or hard it was, made a 
difference in how well the students did. 
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Third Overhead - Practice Questions 
1A. How much would a teacher at this school l ike hamburgers? 
• 
1 B. How much do you like hamburgers? 
• 
2A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does in spell ing? 
• 
28. How much do you think that luck makes a difference in how well 
you do in spel ling? 
• 
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Fourth Overhead - Practice Problem 
How Many Squares? 
How many squares of al l sizes are on the checkerboard below? 
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Student Handout Sheets 
First handout - Example questions 
1A. How much would a teacher at this school l ike hamburgers? 
• 
1 B. How much do you l ike hamburgers? 
• 
2A. How much would a teacher at this school think that luck makes a 
difference in how well a student does in spelling? 
• 
28. How much do you think that luck makes a difference in how well you do 
in spelling? 
• 
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Appendix F 
Scatter Plots for Linearity and Tests for Homogeneity 
The following pages show the scatter plots of the response line ( dependent 
variable) against the reference line (covariate) for each dependent variable at each level 
of analysis. These were used to test the data for linearity. Results of the statistical 
tests for homogeneity are then presented. 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Ability Attribution according to Gender 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: ABILB 
Source Type III df Mean F Sig. Noncent. Observed Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 93892.042 3 3 1297.347 162.235 .000 486.706 1.000 Model 
Intercept 1021.302 1021 .302 5.294 .025 5.294 .618 
GENDER 1624.476 1624.476 8.42 1 .005 8.421  .814 
ABILA 85719.260 85719 .260 444.341 .000 444.34 1 1.000 
GENDER * 973.995 973.995 5 .049 .029 5.049 .598 ABILA 
Error 10803. 1 34 56 192.9 13  
Total 7 15073.0 60 
Corrected 104695.2 59 Total 
Note - ABILA = reference line 
ABILB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Ability Attribution according to Self­
Concept 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: ABILB 
Source 
Type Ill df Mean F Sig. Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 92175.912 3 30725.304 137.438 .000 4 12.3 13 1 .000 
Model 
Intercept 543.686 543.686 2.432 . 125 2.432 .335 
SCORE 8 1.617 8 1.617 .365 .548 .365 .091 
ABILA 80874. 187 80874. 187 361 .759 .000 361 .759 1.000 
SCORE * 130.794 1 130.794 .585 .448 .585 . 1 17 ABILA 
Error 12519.264 56 223.558 
Total 715073.0 60 
Corrected 104695.2 59 Total 
Note - ABILA = reference line 
ABILB = response line 
1 13 
Homogeneity Test Results for Effort Attribution according to Gender 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: EFRTB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 
62910.944 3 20970.3 1 5  33.936 .000 10 1 .808 1 .000 
Model 
Intercept 2762.958 2762.958 4.47 1 .039 4.47 1 .547 
GENDER 92.398 92.398 . 1 50 .700 . 1 50 .067 
EFRTA 58427.867 58427.867 94.553 .000 94.553 1 .000 
GENDER * 
427.257 427.257 .691 .409 .691 . 129 
EFRT 
Error 34604.350 56 6 17.935 
Total 862074. 1  60 
Corrected 
975 15.294 59 
Total 
Note - EFRTA = reference line 
EFRTB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Effort Attribution according to Self­
Concept 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: EFRTB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 
61930. 1 12 3 20643.37 1 32.486 .000 97.459 l .000 Model 
Intercept 3250.306 3250.306 5 . 1 1 5  .028 5. 1 1 5 .604 
SCORE 125.2 1 3  125.2 1 3  . 197 .659 . 1 97 .072 
EFRTA 577 18.613 5771 8.61 3  90.83 1 .000 90.83 1 1 .000 
SCORE * 27.366 27.366 
.043 .836 .043 .055 
EFRT 
Error 
35585 . 183 
56 635.450 
Total 862074. 1 60 
Corrected 975 15 .294 
59 
Total 
Note - EFRTA = reference line 
EFRTB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Luck Attribution according to Gender 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LUCKB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 38707.5 15 3 12902.505 18.257 .000 54.770 1 .000 
Model 
Intercept 4369.652 I 4369.652 6. 183 .016 6. 183 .686 
GENDER 1 189.912 1 189.912 1.684 .200 1.684 .247 
LUCKA 35228.963 35228.963 49.848 .000 49.848 1.000 
GENDER * 244.998 244.998 .347 .558 .347 .089 
LUCK 
Error 39576.728 56 706.727 
Total 157079.7 60 
Corrected 78284.243 59 
Total 
Note - LUCKA = reference line 
LUCKB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Luck Attribution according to Self­
Concept 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LUCKB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 38458.097 3 128 19.366 18.025 .000 54.076 1 .000 Model 
Intercept 3707.532 3707.532 5.213 .026 5.2 13 .612 
SCORE 501.347 501.347 .705 .405 .705 . 13 1  
LUCKA 37238.206 1 37238.206 52.361 .000 52.361 1 .000 
SCORE * 1 100. 185 1 100. 185 1 .547 .219 1 .547 .23 1  LUCK 
Error 39826. 145 56 7 1 1 . 18 1  
Total 157079.7 60 
Corrected 78274.243 59 Total 
Note - LUCKA = reference line 
LUCKB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Task Difficulty Attribution according to 
Gender 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: TDIFFB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 
86275. 109 3 28758.370 68.454 .000 205.362 1 .000 
Model 
Intercept 1 .258 1 .258 .003 .957 .003 .050 
GENDER 1 3 1 .859 1 3 1 .859 .3 14 .578 .3 14 .085 
TDIFFA 84436. 197 84436. 197 200.985 .000 200.985 1 .000 
GENDER * 
5.266 5 .266 .0 13  .91 1  .0 13 .05 1 
TDIFF 
Error 23526.245 56 420. 1 12 
Total 547106.3 60 
Corrected 
109801 .4 59 
Total 
Note - TDIFFA = reference line 
TDIFFB = response line 
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Homogeneity Test Results for Task Difficulty Attribution according to 
Self-Concept 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: TDIFFB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 86126.705 3 28708.902 67.908 .000 203 .724 1 .000 
Model 
Intercept 2.961 I 2.961 .007 .934 .007 .05 1 
SCORE . 5 14  . 5 14  .00 1 .972 .00 1 .050 
TDIFFA 82538.356 82538.356 195.236 .000 1 95.236 1 .000 
SCORE * 
54.214  I 54.2 14 . 128 .722 . 128 .064 
TDIFF 
Error 23674.649 56 422.762 
Total 547106.3 60 
Corrected 109801 .4 59 
Total 
Note - TDIFFA = reference line 
TDIFFB = response line 
1 19 
Appendix G 
Output of Statistical Analyses 
ANOVA for Ability Attribution 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LOG 
Source 
Type III Sum of df Mean Square Squares 
Corrected 6.043E-02 3 2.014E-02 
Model 
Intercept l .740E-02 l .740E-02 
GENDER 5.636E-02 5.636E-02 
SCORE l .398E-02 l .398E-02 
GENDER * 4.006E-02 1 4.006E-02 
SCORE 
Error .669 56 l . 194E-02 
Total .743 60 
Corrected .729 59 
Total 
Note - LOG = log10 (response line/reference line) 
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F 
1 .687 
1 .457 
4.720 
.0 12 
.335 
Sig. 
. 1 80 
.232 
.034 
.914 
.565 
Noncent. Observed 
Parameter Power 
5.060 .41 8  
1 .457 .220 
4.720 .570 
.012 .05 1  
.335 .088 
ANCOVA for Effort Attribution 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: EFRTB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 64838.608 4 16209.652 27.283 0.000 109. 134 1 .000 Model 
Intercept 2733.250 1 2733.250 4.600 0.036 4.600 0.559 
EFRTA 60003.200 1 60003.200 100.995 0.000 100.995 1.000 
GENDER 913 .282 1 913.282 1 .537 0.220 1 .537 0.230 
SCORE 477.5 17 1 477.5 17  0.804 0.374 0.804 0. 143 
GENDER * 2003.003 2003.003 3.371 0.072 3.371 0.438 SCORE 
Error 32676.686 55 594. 122 
Total 862074. l 60 
Corrected 975 15.294 59 
Total 
Note - EFRT A = reference line 
EFRTB = response line 
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ANCOVA for Luck Attribution 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LUCKB 
Source Type III df Mean F Sig. Noncent. Observed Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 38491 .933 4 9622.983 13 .301 .000 53 .203 1 .000 Model 
Intercept 4090.664 4090.664 5.654 .021 5.654 .647 
LUCKA 33 160.358 33 160.358 45.833 .000 45.833 1.000 
GENDER 1 109.275 1 109.275 1.533 .221 1 .533 .229 
SCORE 8.5 178E- 8.5 178E- .000 .991 .000 .050 
02 02 
GENDER * 28.627 1 28.627 .040 .843 .040 .054 SCORE 
Error 39792.3 10 55 723.497 
Total 157079.7 60 
Corrected 78274.243 59 Total 
Note - LUCKA = reference line 
LUCKB = response line 
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ANCOVA for Task Difficulty Attribution 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: TDIFFB 
Source 
Type III 
df 
Mean 
F Sig. 
Noncent. Observed 
Sum of Square Paramete Power 
Squares r 
Corrected 87454.235 4 2 1863.559 53.8 10 .000 215.240 1.000 
Model 
Intercept 1.564 1 1 .564 .004 .95 1 .004 .050 
TDIFFA 85155.685 85 155.685 209.582 .000 209.582 1.000 
GENDER 534.960 1 534.960 1.3 17 .256 1.3 17 .204 
SCORE 269.330 269.330 .663 .419 .663 . 126 
GENDER * 846.797 846.797 2.084 . 155 2.084 .294 
SCORE 
Error 22347. 1 19 55 406.3 1 1  
Total 547106.3 60 
Corrected 109801.4 59 
Total 
Note - TDIFF A = reference line 
TDIFFB = response line 
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Independent Samples t-test for Global Self-Concept and Gender 
SELF-CONCEPT SCORE 
Equal 
SELF-
Variances 
CONCEPT 
Assumed 
SCORE 
Equal 
Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
t df 
-0.305 58.00 
Variances not -0.306 57.8 1 
assumed 
LEVENE'S TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCES 
F Significance 
1 .052 .309 
I-TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS 
95% Confidence Interval 
Sig. Mean Std. Err. of the Mean 
(2-tailed) Diff. Diff. Lower Upper 
0.762 - 1 . 1 9  3 .90 -8.99 6.6 1 
0.760 - 1 . 19 3.88 -8.95 6.57 
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